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This Master’s thesis examines the moral and political claims presented in the climate change debate in the French public 
sphere. My research material includes newspaper coverage from United Nations Climate Change Summits in Copenhagen 
(2009) and Durban (2011) in the French daily Le Monde as well as interviews from local civil society actors. While media 
debates on climate change have been widely studied, the moral dimension of these debates has been largely neglected. 
The objective of this study is to fill this gap and emphasize the moral and cultural dimensions in tracing the problems 
related to global climate governance. Secondly, I will emphasize the growing role of civil society actors in the governance of 
climate change, the solutions they offer and the way in which they justify their arguments.  
 
France is chosen as the context for this study because of its strong commitment to environmental issues at the political 
level. The central role of nuclear power in its energy production as well as France’s active role in shaping EU’s climate 
policy makes it an interesting research context as well. The concepts and methods from political sociology, utilized in this 
study, will shed light on the cultural specificities of this debate in the French media and civil society. 
 
By the theoretical framework of justification theory, developed by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, my objective is to 
analyse climate change related disputes and serve as well as a contribution to this fairly new approach in sociology. With a 
method called Public Justifications Analysis (PJA), I aim to answer the following research questions: What are the specific 
features of the climate change debate in the French media and civil society? What kinds of solutions do different actors 
offer to tackle climate change and how do they justify them morally? What are actors’ conceptions of justice and worth, and 
in which sense do these conceptions differ and on the other hand converge? How is the French political culture visible in 
the public debate and in argumentation? With justification theory we can reach culturally sensitive results in relation to 
climate politics and thus make comparative research between different countries and their climate change debates. In this 
study, the results will be compared to the findings obtained from the U.S. 
 
The main results of the study can be summarized as follows: Firstly, civic values are at the heart of the French 
argumentation forming a bridge between the media debate and the interviews from civil society. French actors argued that 
democratic decision-making in the form of a global, legally binding agreement is the most effective way to tackle climate 
change. French actors also emphasized social justice and called for solidarity and burden sharing between the rich and 
poor countries. Secondly, civil society organisations offered alternative frames in the interviews to understand climate 
politics. In addition, their arguments were generally more radical than those presented in the media debate: they argued 
that market, civic and ecological values are not compatible and therefore suggested more profound changes to the societal 
system by stronger democratic regulation of global economy. Overall, the use of civic arguments seemed to be typical of 
French political culture on the basis of this study’s results. Thirdly, while the relationship between the French state and the 
civil society has traditionally been conflictual, in the case of climate politics it was more based on negotiation and 
mediation. 
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Tämän pro gradu – tutkielman aiheena on ranskalaisessa julkisessa sfäärissä käytävä ilmastonmuutoskeskustelu ja 
siinä esitetyt poliittiset ja moraaliset argumentit. Tutkimusaineistoni koostuu Le Monde - lehden sanomalehtiuutisoinnista  
YK: n ilmastokonferenssien ajalta Kööpenhaminasa (2009) ja Durbanissa (2011) sekä paikallisen kansalaisyhteiskunnan 
toimijoiden haastatteluista. Ilmastopoliittinen keskustelu mediassa on saanut tutkimuskohteena laajaa huomiota 
sosiaalitieteissä mutta tämän keskustelun moraalinen ulottuvuus on jäänyt laajalti huomiotta. Tämän tutkielman 
tarkoituksena onkin paikata tämä aukko ja korostaa ilmastonmuutoksen globaaliin hallintaan liittyviä moraalisia ja 
kulttuurisia ulottuvuuksia. Toiseksi, tässä tutkielmassa alleviivataan kansalaisyhteiskunnan kasvavaa roolia 
ilmastopolitiikassa, heidän tarjoamia ratkaisuja ja tapoja, joilla he oikeuttavat argumenttejaan. 
 
Ranskassa ympäristöasioihin on sitouduttu vahvasti poliittisella tasolla. Ydinvoiman keskeinen rooli Ranskan 
energiantuotannossa ja maan vahva rooli EU: n ilmastopolitiikan kehystämisessa tekee siitä myös mielenkiintoisen 
tutkimuskontekstin. Poliittinen sosiologia tarjoaa käsitteet ja metodit, joilla mediassa ja kansalaisyhteiskunnassa 
tapahtuvan ilmastokeskustelun ranskalaisiin erityispiirteisiin päästään käsiksi.  
 
Tämän tutkielman teoreettinen viitekehys on Luc Boltanskin ja Laurent Thévenot’n kehittämä oikeuttamisteoria. 
Pyrkimyksenä on analysoida ilmastonmuutokseen liittyviä kiistoja ja myös kontribuoida tälle verrattain uudelle 
lähestymistavalle sosiologiassa. Julkisen oikeuttamisen analyysimenetelmää (JOA) käyttäen pyrin vastaamaan 
seuraaviin tutkimuskysymyksiin: mitkä ovat ilmastonmuutoskeskustelun erityispiirteet ranskalaisessa mediassa ja 
kansalaisyhteiskunnassa? Millaisia ratkaisuja erilaiset toimijat tarjoavat ilmastonmuutoksen torjumiseksi ja miten he 
perustelevat ne moraalisesti? Mitkä ovat toimijoiden käsitykset oikeudenmukaisuudesta ja arvosta, ja millä tavoin nämä 
käsitykset yhtyvät ja eroavat? Miten ranskalainen poliittinen kulttuuri näkyy julkisessa keskustelussa ja argumenttien 
käytössä? Oikeuttamisteorian avulla voi saavuttaa kulttuurisesti sensitiivejä tuloksia ilmastopolitiikkaan liittyen ja näin 
tulokset tarjoavat vertailevaa materiaalia eri maiden välisiä jatkotutkimuksia varten. Tässä tutkielmassa verrataankin 
tuloksia samalla metodilla saatuihin tuloksiin Yhdysvalloissa käytävästä ilmastokeskustelusta. 
 
Tutkimustulokset voidaan tiivistää seuraavasti: ensinnäkin, kansalaisarvot ovat ranskalaisen argumentaation 
sydämessä, muodostaen sillan mediassa käytävän debatin ja kansalaisyhteiskunnan haastattelujen välille. 
Ranskalaisten toimijoiden mielestä demokraattinen päätöksenteko globaalin, sitovan sopimuksen muodossa on 
tehokkain tapa torjua ilmastonmuutosta. Toimijat korostivat myös sosiaalista oikeudenmukaisuutta sekä 
peräänkuuluttivat solidaarisuutta ja taakanjakoa rikkaiden ja köyhien maiden välille. Toiseksi, kansalaisjärjestöt tarjosivat 
haastatteluissa vaihtoehtoisia kehyksiä ymmärtää ilmastopolitiikkaa. Heidän esittämänsä argumentit olivat myös yleisesti 
ottaen radikaalimpia kuin mediakeskustelussa esiintyneet argumentit: kansalaisjärjestöjen mielestä markkina - kansalais 
– ja ympäristöarvot eivät ole yhteensovitettavissa ja täten korostivat syvempiä muutoksia koko yhteiskunnalliseen 
järjestelmään globaalin talouden vahvemmalla demokraattisella säätelyllä. Kaiken kaikkiaan, kansalaisarvot näyttävän 
olevan tyypillinen ranskalaisen poliittisen kulttuurin piirre. Kolmanneksi, vaikka valtion ja kansalaisyhteiskunnan välinen 
suhde on perinteisesti ollut konfliktuaalinen Ranskassa, ilmastopolitiikan suhteen se perustui enemmän neuvottelúun ja 
sovitteluun. 
 
 
 
Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords 
Oikeuttamisteoria 
Ilmastopolitiikka 
Kansalaisyhteiskunta 
Poliittinen kulttuuri 
Julkinen keskustelu 
 
  
Contents 
1	   Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1	  
2	   Problem of Climate Change: Dimensions and Roles of Science, Politics and the 
Media......................................................................................................................... 4	  
 2.1	  Governing Climate Change............................................................................ 5	  
 2.2	  Civil Society’s Role in Climate Politics......................................................... 9	  
 2.3	  Portrayals of Climate Change in the Media: Norms and Tendencies .......... 12	  
 2.4	  Climate Change Debate and Political Culture in France ............................. 16	  
3	   Theoretical Perspective, Method and Data......................................................... 22	  
 3.1	  Justifying Actions in Dispute Situations: Justification Theory.................... 23	  
 3.2	  Public Justifications Analysis (PJA) ............................................................ 25	  
 3.3	  Combining Media Data with Interviews ...................................................... 26	  
 3.4	  Coding scheme............................................................................................. 30	  
4	   Analysis I: Figures from the Media Debate ....................................................... 33	  
 4.1	  Speakers and Areas ...................................................................................... 33	  
 4.2	  Justifications................................................................................................. 36	  
5	   Analysis II: French Specificities in the Media Debate....................................... 39	  
 5.1	  Civic World at the Heart of the French Debate............................................ 39	  
 5.2	  Clashes between the World of Ecology and the Market World................... 48	  
6	   Analysis III: Civil Society’s Alternative Frames to Climate Politics ................ 55	  
 6.1	  Democratic Regulation vs. Market Solutions .............................................. 56	  
 6.2	  Climate Justice: Demands for Another Society ........................................... 62	  
7	   Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 64	  
Bibliography............................................................................................................ 71	  
 
 
 
  1 
1 Introduction 
 
“Europe and the rich countries, we must accept that our responsibility is heavier than others … 
our engagement must therefore be stronger … who dares to say that Africa and the poor 
countries do not need the money? … Who dares to say that we do not need an organization to 
monitor the respect of these engagements?” (President Nicolas Sarkozy, Le Monde 17.12.2009. 
All translations are by the author of this study) 
In a globalized, interdependent world social, political and economic problems tend to 
have an impact across national borders, demanding action at the supranational level. 
This is no exception to environmental problems, especially to climate change, that is 
perhaps the best example of the interconnected faiths and futures of the humanity, 
demanding acute and shared actions. According to World Bank’s recent report called 
“Turn Down the Heat”, the climate is at risk to warm up to 4 degrees in the future, 
leading to dramatic consequences for the environment and human populations (World 
Bank 2012). 
 
Nevertheless, it is also a problem to which the global community has not yet been able 
to find a common solution; international conferences, like the last one in Doha 
(COP18)1, Qatar, have failed one after another. The fact that the pace of global actions 
does not meet the pace of discussions shows that climate change is not just a scientific 
problem; obstacles standing in the way of resolutions and decisions are above all 
political and moral (Newell 2009, 9). The multi-dimensional difficulties of preventing 
climate change have therefore been a growingly popular topic in social sciences. (e.g. 
Giddens 2009; Urry 2011.)  
 
This study aims as well at understanding these political and moral disputes in the 
climate change debate which range from conflicting North-South relations to solutions 
of climate change mitigation such as green technology, state regulation and carbon 
trading. Many kinds of actors engage in these debates at local, national and global levels; 
scientists, politicians, enterprises, civic groups, individual citizens and even celebrities 
                                                
1 The 18th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was organized this year in Doha; these annual meetings serve as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol with the objective to establish a framework for 
intergovernmental efforts to tackle the challenge posed by climate change. In this study these meetings 
are referred to shortly as COP’s. (www.unfccc.int) 
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form various kinds of networks and loops in which they influence each other. In this 
specific study, the focus is on this debate in France: the objective is to shed light on 
actors’ political and moral conceptions that cause resistance and disagreement in the 
climate change debate that has in current research been overshadowed with technical 
and economic frameworks. Furthermore, the aim is to examine cultural specificities and 
how the national political culture is visible in the debate. 
 
This study is using Boltanski and Thévenot’s moral sociology, justification theory 
(1991) more specifically, and its worlds of justification as a theoretical framework to 
investigate actors’ moral argumentation in climate change related disputes. I am going 
to explore actors’ different conceptions of justice and what kind of means and solutions 
they offer to prevent climate change: firstly, by examining actors’ claims in the media, 
the French newspaper of reference, Le Monde during the Copenhagen (2009) and 
Durban (2011) COP’s. And secondly by interviewing civil society actors at the local 
level, Paris, where civic groups promote sustainable policies and participate in the 
defining of the common good among citizens. 
 
The emphasis on civil society is justified by current social scientific literature that 
underlines civil society’s growing role in the governance of climate change (e.g. 
Bulkeley & Newell 2010; Betsill & Corell 2008; Wapner 1996). The very framing of 
climate change as a global problem has tended to neglect other levels and forms on 
engaging in climate politics. Accounts of international negotiations and cooperation do 
not suffice to describe the varied landscape of climate governance which includes, in 
addition to nation states, many non-state actors like enterprises, consumers and NGO’s 
which also contribute to GHG emissions in everyday processes of production and 
consumption. (Bulkeley & Newell 2010, 2–3.)  
 
This is also why the role of civil society organizations is emphasized in this study: they 
are considered as active participants in climate politics, both at the national and at the 
grass root where they offer supplementary as well as alternative ways to understand the 
social dynamics of climate change. The purpose of combining these different levels of 
analysis is to examine the ways in which local, national and global debates are 
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connected and intertwined in an environmental issue like the climate change, France 
being the national point of reference. In particular, the purpose is to gain comparative 
material to trace differences in moral argumentation, stemming from different political 
cultures. 
 
This study is part of a comparative research project called “Climate Change and Civil 
Society” by Helsinki Research Group for Political Sociology (HEPO): the codebook 
used in this study has been developed during the project. Its purpose is to compare 
climate change debates in the media and to analyse the role of civil society actors in 
climate politics in six different national contexts: France, Finland, Russia, USA, India 
and Indonesia. In this study, the findings from France will be compared to those 
obtained from the U.S. 
 
Finally, my specific research questions are the following: What are the specific features 
of the climate change debate in the French media and civil society? What kinds of 
solutions do different actors offer to tackle climate change and how do they justify them 
morally? What are actors’ conceptions of justice and worth, and in which sense do these 
conceptions differ and on the other hand converge? How is the French political culture 
visible in the public debate and in argumentation? 
 
The outline of this study is the following: in chapter 2 I will first present the relevant 
background elements of this study including earlier research and the specific context of 
France. I will then move on to the presentation of the theoretical framework, the method 
and the data. The first analysis chapter will present the quantitative results of the study 
obtained from the media debate. The second one will reflect on these findings in a more 
qualitative fashion. In the third analysis chapter, I will examine the findings from the 
interviews; they will be analysed in relation and comparison to the media data to deepen 
our understanding of the dynamics of the debate in France and civil society’s role in it.  
 
Based on earlier studies that apply justification theory to the French context (e.g. 
Lamont & Thévenot 2000; Luhtakallio 2010), my hypothesis is that arguments 
stemming from the civic world will be in a crucial position in the French climate change 
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debate. The role of industrial arguments, relating to state planning and scientific facts, 
will also be strong. In relation to earlier media studies on climate change, I also 
hypothesize that differences in moral argumentation in different national media are not 
merely result of differing journalistic norms (see e.g. Brossard et al. 2004) but wider 
implications of differences in political cultures. 
2 Problem of Climate Change: Dimensions and Roles of Science, Politics and the 
Media 
In addition to approaches that emphasize the important role of environmental NGO’s in 
current climate change politics, many academics argue that we are also in need of social 
scientific approaches in general to fully understand the scope of challenge. It has been 
critized that natural scientists and economists have mainly dominated the understanding 
of climate change and its processes. In his recent book “Climate Change and Society”, 
John Urry (2011) argues that this has led to “the neglect of society”: natural sciences 
have relatively little understanding of how societies are organized and how societies 
should be reorganized in the future. (Urry 2011, 2.) 
Why does society or “the social” matter then? Urry highlights the fact that resource 
scarcity is about societal processes; we live in a high carbon society that has made 
western lifestyle “in the Rich North” possible. Consequently, the importance of 
examining the history, development and consequences of that society becomes crucial. 
According to Urry, the individual is above all a part of social practices and institutions, 
a creature of social routine and habit, meaning construction, local customs and fashion. 
(Urry 2011, 3.)  
In social sciences, climate change is related to very fundamental discussions like the 
dichotomies of social and biological and individual and society. In consequence, it is no 
wonder that it is becoming more popular as a research topic. Climate change raises new 
ideas about the relationship between human beings and nature and widens our 
traditional understanding of human agency (see e.g. Latour 2006; Urry 2011). 
Also, nature has strong political implications in a way that it sets limits to economic 
growth and capitalist production in the form of global warming. This brings about 
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political disputes in the community because different social groups have different kinds 
of interests and therefore share different views on what is significant and important in 
nature. (Haila & Lähde 2003, 7–36.) 
This chapter will start with general aspects concerning the governance of climate 
change: how climate change rose to the political agenda, which actors have participated 
to the definition of the problem and what the current trends regarding the governance 
and solutions to climate change are. I will then present earlier research of climate 
change in the media and how justification theory has earlier been used in analyzing 
environmental disputes.  I will finish the chapter with the presentation of the French 
context.  
2.1 Governing Climate Change 
According to Bulkeley and Newell (2010), climate change is a multiscale, multiactor 
and socially and economically embedded problem. Examining the shifting terrain of 
climate change governance widens our understanding of actors involved and their 
respective responsibility. (Bulkeley & Newell 2010, 4.)  
 
The role of science 
Scientific knowledge about climate change has been available since the 1960’s but it 
managed to move to the political agenda and establish itself as a social problem 
somewhat 20 years later. Institutional reactions include the establishment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 and the formal signature of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 at 
the Rio Earth Summit. (Corfee–Morlot, Maslin & Burgess 2007, 2741–2742.)  
The global science community has had an overall consensual view on climate science 
but it is also perhaps the most political of all domains of science. Following, the work of 
the IPCC has been heavily politicized from the beginning. This is because science 
reports on the impacts and threats of climate change and economic costs relating to it: 
there is a lot at stake for different actors. Still, scientific facts are widely used to defend 
and legitimize positions because the objectivity of science makes scientific claims 
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attractive and victorious over other less scientific claims. (Bulkeley & Newell 2010, 27 
- 28.) 
However, climate science is regularly clashing with hostile interests like carbon 
interests and the climate sceptics. The uncertainty of science and the claim that 
scientists exaggerate findings are commonly used weapons for sceptics that are trying to 
deny anthropocentric climate change (Bulkeley & Newell 2010, 28). In relation to these 
interests, there are many influential think tanks especially in the US that seek to 
undermine climate change science and exploit the very nature of science itself; by 
highlighting dispute, controversy and uncertainty. The sceptics’ arguments are usually 
very weak scientifically but still they have managed to exert huge influence in the eyes 
of the public. The most effective think tanks have tight connections with corporations 
and the oil industry; it is said that many oil companies are bigger and more powerful 
than many governments. (Urry 2011, 94–100.) 
International negotiations and north - south relations 
States on the other hand negotiate on the appropriate and just measures at regular 
intervals at the supranational level. The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change in Kyoto in 1997 is considered to be a landmark in climate change 
negotiations because it managed to produce an international treaty called The Kyoto 
Protocol. It includes binding emission reductions for wealthy, industrialized countries 
who are required to cut down greenhouse gases by 5, 2 % below 1990 level by the year 
2012.  The Kyoto Protocol doesn’t include restrictions for poorer, developing countries 
but instead presents multiple instruments referred to as flexible market mechanisms such 
as emissions trading and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to induce emission 
reductions in developing countries as well. (Bulkeley & Newell 2010, 24–28.) Despite 
of the success in Kyoto, international climate change conferences are notorious for 
being all about talk instead of actions. 
Governments are decisive players in the UN Conferences. Their negotiating behaviour 
is influenced not only by scientific data but also by their interests. Some countries are 
for example more dependent on the use or production of fossil fuels than others and 
some countries are more vulnerable to the negative impacts of climate change. Also, the 
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willingness to participate in adaptation and mitigation processes through financing 
varies between countries; there are “polluter interests” and “helper interests”. (Oberthur 
& Ott 1999, 13.) 
There are also many negotiating blocs in climate politics whose interests clash regularly 
like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries OPEC and The Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS) that are most threatened by climate change. The European 
Union has overall had a positive attitude towards emission reductions but there is some 
division among the member states. What comes to a legally binding treaty in cutting 
down CO2emissions the US has adopted the strategy of resistance although this line has 
become more yielding after the Bush administration. (Newell 2000, 13–22.) 
One of the most problematic issues has yet been the question of historical responsibility 
for causing global warming and following from this, the demand for burden sharing. 
Conflicts arise when industrialized parts of the world have caused global warming but it 
is the poor, developing parts that suffer the most of its consequences. This notion links 
climate change directly to questions of social justice and equity. In the language of 
UNFCCC, the responsibility is “common but differentiated”. The debate has focused on 
governance of aid and technology transfers from developed countries: these are 
regarded as inducements to cooperate and mitigate the impacts of climate change in 
tackling a problem to which they have little to do with. The politics of North-South 
becomes evident also in the sense that poor countries’ governments and scientists lack 
capacities and competences to fully participate in international. (Bulkeley & Newell 
2010, 29.) 
This theme refers to climate justice, which is a central theme of this study as well. Many 
Southern countries like China, India and Brazil have taken the line that the main 
responsibility for climate change lays within the historically responsible and rich 
Northern countries that therefore should pay the most of costs. 
Solutions to climate change 
The debate over appropriate policy methods has heated the debate and increased 
conflicts still. Proposed methods include for example financial aid for developing 
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countries, green technologies, taxation, emission trading and changing individual 
everyday practices.  
One notable trend in climate change governance is the growing emphasis on market-
based solutions and flexibility mechanisms instead of relying on governments to 
produce effective outcomes. Carbon trading in particular highlights the principle of 
efficiency as the guiding line in climate policy: the advocates of carbon trading argue 
that it reduces emissions more effectively than international treaties. However, many 
market solutions like emission trading rely on institutional backing in many ways and 
the problems relating to transparency and democratic accountability of these 
mechanisms makes them even more complex. (Bulkeley & Newell 2010, 31–33.) 
Bulkeley and Newell argue that the fact that market approaches are becoming more 
popular is unsurprising regarding the current era of neo-liberal policies: the broader 
political context is very important to keep in mind when trying to assess why certain 
solutions are seen as more valid, legitimate and plausible than some others. This 
political context might also explain why state regulation might be “out of fashion” and 
instead more flexible approaches like voluntary private-public-partnerships are favoured 
instead. (Bulkeley & Newell 2010, 31–33.) 
Private governance of climate change has therefore become more visible: private sector 
organizations and key industries in energy and transportation in particular play central 
role in lobbying governments. Still, increasing amount of enterprises have started to see 
climate change as a possibility to business rather than a threat and started to take 
voluntary action to reduce their emissions through self-regulation. (Bulkeley & Newell 
2010, 87–90.) 
Especially while international negotiations have failed to produce sufficient results it 
has become clear that addressing climate change requires action and innovative 
solutions at all levels; engaging communities in mitigation and adaptation processes at 
the grass root has therefore become a key policy goal because communities are 
embedded in everyday practices of consumption and production. Governments and 
NGO’s participate in this mobilization of citizens; behavioural changes at home and 
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work place saves energy, money and reduces emissions of GHG’s. (Bulkeley & Newell 
2010, 70–71.) 
As we can see, climate policy is not simply an issue dealt with in the global, UN 
framework. Non-state actors are central to the governance of climate change as well: 
they work in delegations, negotiate, interact with the media and protest on the streets. 
These non-state actors include alongside environmental NGO’s, business lobbies, 
scientists and many other actors that form rich and vibrant networks, escaping 
traditional levels of analysis. (Newell & Bulkeley 2010, 34.) This is also why this study 
combines a local, NGO - perspective to a national media perspective: the aim is to grasp 
a more profound picture of climate politics in France. 
2.2 Civil Society’s Role in Climate Politics 
The growing role and political force of civil society organizations and social 
movements has been growing since the 60’s; they have managed to make a profound 
impact on issues such as human rights and protection of environment. Most lately, the 
anti-globalization movement has been opposing neo-liberal globalization and arguing 
that another world is possible. (Della Porta & Diani 2006, 1-2.)  
Referring to the wider context of academic discussions, we can speak of the crisis of 
democracy (e.g. Rosanvallon 2008) and deliberative democracy (e.g. Habermas 1996). 
Relating to climate politics, many academics see NGO’s and civic groups as an opposite 
to conventional politics: since the 60’s these groups have tried to emphasize the bads in 
western lifestyle and consumption habits that result to incalculable and catastrophic 
consequences.  
 “Unlike almost all other politics in world history, it is a politics for lower 
 consumption of goods and services for one’s own social group”. (Urry 2011, 100.) 
Many academics argue that the role of civil society and its associations is growing 
bigger and more important in current times. Archon Fung argues that they represent 
better peoples’ interests and that they enhance the quality of policy making: civil society 
organisations are important channels for citizens to express their opinions, concerns and 
to influence the contents of the political agenda. (Fung 2003, 523.) Pierre Rosanvallon 
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has also stated that civil society organisations are mostly legitimate actors in the eyes of 
citizens because they have acquired expert and practical knowledge by focusing on a 
certain sector in a society. (Rosanvallon 2008, 97.) 
Alongside the scientific community and the mass media, environmental groups have 
raised public awareness and put pressure on politicians. The actors of the global civil 
society have been successful in mobilizing people in concerning issues like climate 
change; from the 90’s onwards they have actively participated in the discussion. Civic 
organizations are usually part of wider, global networks and through publicity they aim 
to create pressure because they want to affect national policies and world politics. 
Through politicization the civil society aims to raise climate change into to the political 
agenda. This in turn creates loops and pressure between different levels (Newell 2000, 
30).  
As stated before, the discussions on deliberative democracy have a direct link to the 
discussions of civil society; deliberative democracy has been strikingly visible in recent 
discussions about the future of representative democracy. The role of rational discussion 
and argumentative exchange of opinions that take place in the public sphere have been 
seen as significant in the development of global democracy. Accordingly, many 
theorists argue that civil society organizations contribute democratically in the 
discussions and debates in the public sphere. (Rosanvallon 2008, 234; Habermas 1996, 
367.)  
Habermas says that the civil society consists of more or less spontaneous associations 
and social movements, which, unlike the bourgeois publicity that is governed by the 
mass media, the economy and centralized interests, transfer awareness of social 
problems in a more versatile way in to the public sphere.  In an ideal situation these 
civil society actors would offer practical solutions into existing political problems and 
they would also have influence in policy making. (Habermas 1996, 367–372.) Fung also 
argues that civil society organizations form a public sphere that is not in the same 
amount influenced by money, social status or personal relations. (Fung 2003, 524–525.) 
Nowadays, it is more relevant to talk of transnational public spheres. However, Nancy 
Fraser has aimed at repoliticizing public sphere theory and recognizing the limits of the 
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deliberative model by pointing to power relations in relation to equity and legitimacy of 
different opinions in the public sphere. She thus questions the normative legitimacy of 
public opinion and whether it is politically effective or functions as a genuine critical 
arena for discussions, which was the ideal presented by Habermas. (Fraser 2007, 7–9.)  
Furthermore, while the mass media maintains the public space in modern societies it is 
by no means the only stage for public discussion; public space is present in the everyday 
communication of people. Public space is shaped and influenced a lot by civil society 
actors too that are trying to create “new public space”, independent of mainstream 
media. (Newell 2000, 13.)  
NGO’s most effective tool is undoubtedly the media: using it they mobilize people and 
expose environmental problems and scandals by global shaming. Still, environmental 
NGO’s like Greenpeace have been critized to exaggerate the dangers of climate change 
and they too have been tarred with the brush of scandal occasionally.  (Urry 2011, 94–
104.) 
In climate politics, environmental NGO’s have had the role of watchdog and monitor as 
well as realizing local projects among communities. Most interestingly, they have tried 
to influence policies through rather technical strategies: with provision of advice, 
expertise and knowledge. In the international arena, NGO’s have performed many of the 
same functions as state officials: they represent different interests and offer their 
complementary point of views. (Betsill & Corell 2007, 12.) The analyses on the role of 
NGO’s in international climate policy have overall concluded that NGO’s have 
exercised real influence in promoting climate policy, independent of state actors in the 
UN negotiations (e.g. Conca 1995). 
As we have seen, in academic literature it has been common to speak of the 
development of global civil society as an entity but current approaches emphasize the 
growing divisions in the global civil society. Ruth Reitan argues that there is a divide 
between more reformist NGOs and more radical, direct action social movements. These 
new tendencies refer to NGO’s different conceptions about the appropriate form of 
current global governance like the role of neo-liberal politics. (Reitan 2007, 446.) 
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The global civil society is nowadays organized around a few networks that emphasize 
and value to some extent different things in climate politics. The biggest of them is the 
Climate Action Network (CAN). The Climate Justice Now! (CJN) – network (formed in 
Bali in 2007) integrates movements like Via Campesina, Attac and Third World 
Network and is more focused on the relationship of environmental and social questions. 
In France, key environmental NGOs formed the French branch of the CAN in 1996, Le 
Réseau Action Climat (RAC). Majority of French environmental NGO’s belongs to this 
network.  
Political culture and NGO’s 
The relationship between local political contexts and civil society organizations is 
crucial in order to understand the actions of NGO’s (e.g. Alapuro 2005). Political 
culture affects the action (or inaction) of NGO’s and gives special characteristics to the 
ways NGO’s function, how they organize themselves and pursue their goals. Fung also 
says that the methods social movements use in pursuing their goals can enhance 
democracy in some contexts but they can be harmful and even generate hostility in other 
contexts. (Fung 2003, 534.)  
The aim of this study is to find out how French NGO’s are trying to promote sustainable 
development and how this action is influenced, both in enabling and restricting ways, by 
cultural factors. People organize in many different ways, locally and globally, in the 
pursuit of common interests: their actions affect national and global policies on climate 
change. (Urry 2011, 4.) This is why the study of local civil society and its organizations 
is relevant.  
2.3 Portrayals of Climate Change in the Media: Norms and Tendencies 
In this section I will present earlier research on the climate change debate in the media. 
This research has mainly been centred on studying frames, news coverage and 
nationally varying journalistic norms in different national media settings. In this thesis, 
media logics are not the main focus itself but the climate political statements made by 
different actors and how the French political context affects them, both by enabling and 
restricting ways. 
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The media has a huge role in the agenda-setting players in the politics of climate change. 
Newell poses a link between media coverage on climate change and the policy 
responses that are considered necessary; they are to some extent related and dependent.  
The media exerts huge influence by projecting a particular account of climate change; it 
is not and cannot be treated as an objective account but a construction of a social 
problem and its social meanings. (Newell 2000, 68–69.)                            
Social issues like environmental issues tend to have a cyclical pattern in the media: the 
“issue - attention – cycle” was developed by Anthony Downs in 1972. According to the 
cycle, public attention concerning problems such as the environment usually passes 
certain phases in the media. There is a preproblem stage followed by a period of 
alarmed discovery of the problem and an eagerness to solve it rapidly. Then, comes 
realization of the costs associated to solving the problem at hand and as a consequence, 
a decline in public interest. Finally there is the postproblem phase, which is 
characterized by the settlement of public attention, and sometimes the sporadic return of 
interests. 
Downs (1972) argues that the inherent characteristics in environmental issues favour 
these cyclical ups and downs in media coverage. He also notes that environmental 
issues do not sell that well in the media. Accordingly, these global ups and downs in 
media coverage have been well documented in social research. 
In the field of framing theory on the one hand, Ulrika Ulausson (2009) has explored 
cognitive frames for understanding global warming with ”Critical Discourse Analysis” 
(CDA) and how meaning is constructed in news stories. She claims that there are 
national differences in the national media logic and that this ”banal nationalism” is an 
obstacle in tackling with a transnational social issue like climate change. (Ulausson 
2009, 428.) The News media is after all in a powerful and crucial role in framing 
environmental issues.  
Another way to study climate change in the media is to compare media coverage cross-
culturally. Brossard, Shanahan & McComas (2004) have done a cross-cultural 
comparison of media coverage of global warming to analyse different kinds of media 
systems. In their article they compare the newspapers The New York Times and Le 
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Monde. The quantitative data has been collected in 1987–1997; that was the period 
when climate change emerged into the collective consciousness as a social problem. 
But why is climate change suitable to study these differences in the media? First, it is a 
scientific issue and secondly, it is a political issue. In the former case, values and norms 
are considered to cross national boundaries whereas in the latter, national political 
cultures vary. But, even though science can be viewed as “a universal project”, uniting 
people around the globe, the public’s attitudes towards it and the environment vary 
nationally. The heated media debate in the United Stated is a perfect example of this. 
Thirdly, climate change is an issue that concerns all nations and cultures equally. 
(Brossard et al. 2004, 360–361.) 
Brossard’s et al. argue that in both countries, information in the media had to be 
significant and novel, to exceed the threshold and to draw the public attention; “this is a 
journalistic reality in the U.S. as well as in France”. This is a particular problem in the 
former because nearly all the media is run for profit. Journalists also frame narratives 
differently to make the news more “exciting”. (Brossard et al. 2004, 362.) 
Results were also in favour of cultural differences in climate change reporting. The New 
York Times emphasized the negative consequences of climate change, generating fear 
and focusing more on domestic aspects. On the other hand Le Monde emphasized 
international relations and negotiations. At least up till the 21st century the French 
media did not give that much space for conflicts between scientists because climate 
change was considered to be an undisputable fact; the controversy was mainly of a 
diplomatic kind. In addition, the construction of the European community as a strong 
negotiator, in opposition to the passive U.S. government was often used as a narrative. 
Down’s cyclical pattern was apparent for the American media coverage but didn’t 
manifest as visibly in the French media coverage. (Brossard et al. 2004, 363–366.) 
Also, according to Brossard’s findings, the media system in France has several unique 
features that vary from the U.S. system. French journalism is considered to be more 
journalism of “opinion” rather than of information or objectivity. The French press is 
more indirect, using storytelling, personal opinions and loose references in making their 
claims. The American press offers more different viewpoints and concrete sources on 
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climate change because of its objectivist ideal in journalism that emphasizes the 
importance to give equal weight to at least two different viewpoints on an issue. There 
is also a tradition of political and social commitment in the French press. (Brossard et al. 
2004, 363.) 
Regarding Down’s issue attention cycle however, Brossard et al. criticize it from the 
lack of cultural sensitivity; the model neglects cultural factors and national journalistic 
norms that were visible according to their studies. Newell also argues that the media 
attention cycle has come to the point where technical and political complexity is more 
apparent, whereupon media attention on climate change has declined and the coverage 
on climate change is very event-oriented; climate change is not usually put into the 
context of earlier societal and economic decisions and processes but environmental 
catastrophes are often described as “a freak of nature”. (Newell 2000, 90.) 
This brief discussion on climate change in the media has demonstrated how climate 
change has been studied in media studies. Following, this study aims at filling the lacks 
with an approach that goes beyond national journalistic norms, issue cycles and frames 
in order to form a more comprehensible picture of the climate change debate.  
Media system in France 
I will next shortly present the media system in France. It is proportionally versatile, 
heterogenic and plural. It contains local, regional and national newspapers, varying in 
taste, interest and point of view; it has been said that the social diversity of the French 
society is mirrored in the media. Also, the French media is not afraid to show their 
economic, party political or ideological sympathies or affiliations. However, there is 
evidence that the “healthy pluralism” is declining also in France; the media is faced 
with increasing competition, economic imperatives and concentration of ownership. 
(Kuhn 1995, 15–17.)  
In France, it is also difficult to speak of “a national daily press”; the Paris daily 
newspapers sell predominantly in the greater Paris area (Kuhn 1995, 31). However, this 
does not mean that the Parisian press has a lower status or is less influential; totally the 
opposite. The Paris dailies are the most dominant players in the French media. Paris 
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based newspapers such as Le Figaro, Libération and Le Monde are the stages for elite 
opinion forming. These papers have a strong influence on key political and economic 
decision makers and they function as a forum for the discussion of new ideas and 
solutions to social problems. (Kuhn 1995, 31–32.) 
2.4 Climate Change Debate and Political Culture in France 
France is an interesting country regarding climate politics because of many reasons. 
Firstly, France has an active role in the European Unions’ climate policy and is 
therefore one of the main agenda setters. In its national climate policy France has also 
set ambitious goals2. Secondly, France is very dependent of nuclear power, which has 
been criticized by civil society actors. Relating to my specific research questions, it is 
also interesting to examine the relationship between the state and the civil society since 
it is quite oppositional and conflictual compared to many other countries like the Nordic 
countries. The ways in which the state and on the other hand NGO’s participate and 
define climate policy, are therefore worth studying.  
In this section I will first present features of the institutional setting in France: some 
facts that affect and structure this debate in the background. Then, I will move onto 
more cultural determinants. 
French climate policy 
Even though scientific knowledge about climate change has been well available since 
the early 80’s when UN started to organize international conferences on climate change, 
it developed into a fully acknowledged public problem not until the year 2000 in France. 
Then, France proposed its first comprehensive climate action program. This also led to 
the establishment of institutional actors in climate policy like the national agency for 
energy efficiency and savings (ADEME). In 2004, it launched a communication 
campaign to promote individual energy savings, emphasizing that individuals are 
responsible for 50 per cent of French greenhouse gas emissions. NGOs, journalists, the 
                                                
2 The official climate policy of France and Le Plan Climat are presented at the website of the Ministry of 
Ecology, Sustainable development and energy. (http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/La-politique-
climatique-de-la.html) 
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educational system, and some scientists also took part in this discourse of promoting 
individual green practices. (Aykut, Comby & Guillemot 2012, 160-164.)  
Nowadays, France describes itself as a “carbon-free country”. France’s climate policy is 
presented in its « Le Plan Climat 2004-2012 »: it is the action plan where France 
explains how it is going to respect the demands of the Kyoto Protocol. This action plan 
is also recognized in the law. This climate law was adopted in 2005 and it states that the 
battle against global warming is the priority of France’s energy politics. According to 
this ambitious law, France’s objective is to cut down emissions by 3 % every year until 
2050.  
“In 2004, France’s GHG emissions were only 1 % of total world emissions and its 
emissions have been steadily declining since the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. France’s 
relatively low emission rates are explained by the following factors: 1) low use of carbon 
and gas in the production of electricity and the fact that other countries have not taken 
advantage of nuclear power plants as vastly as France 2) the strong role of hydraulic 
electricity, France being the second largest producer of renewable energy, and 3) 
France’s fleet of cars is one of the least polluting … Consequently, France has been able 
to break the connection between economic growth and GHG emissions ; its GDP has 
continued to grow in the same period.” (http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/La-
politique-climatique-de-la.html) 
As we can see above, France clearly emphasizes its low GHG emissions. However, 
these official documents only focus on the emissions produced within the French 
borders. Also, French GHG emissions are considerably lower than they might otherwise 
be without the oil crisis provoked by OPEC’s actions in the 1970’s. Then, France 
decided to become more independent of world energy markets and started to invest 
radically in nuclear power. (Giddens 2011, 35.) 
The vast use of nuclear power has raised a lot of opposition especially by the French 
civil society organizations. The movement against nuclear power, including actors like 
Greenpeace France and the citizen network Sortir du nucléaire (Exit from nuclear 
power), is consequently very visible in France due to the strong dependency on nuclear 
power - even 75 % of the electricity used in France comes from nuclear power plants. 
France’s former president Nicolas Sarkozy organized a series of meetings in 2007 that 
were called La Grenelle de l’Environnement and which finally led to a law called 
Grenelle 1 (2007) and Grenelle 2 (2010). Its purpose was to discuss long-term political 
decisions regarding sustainable development, energy efficiency and the reduction of 
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GHG’s. This programme belonged to the domain of the Ministry of Ecology and is very 
interesting in the sense that it gathers together actors from different fields like experts, 
French environmental NGO’s and politicians3. 
Overall, ecological issues seem to have grown in popularity among the French if we 
look at election results: the success of the green coalition, Europe-Écologie, in the EU’s 
parliamentary elections in 2009 and the Green Party’s success in the regional elections 
in 2010 are all current indicators of this:  
“… Something has changed in the country of ecology. The movement felt to grow wings. 
Among its leaders, ambitions were clearly formulated: a group in the Senate, one in the 
Assembly, minister posts in case of victory of the left … Nowadays, the 
environmentalists want to weigh … During a working meeting with the Green German 
comrades from Grünen, on 30th September, Cécile Duflot did not hesitate to mention ‘the 
rising force of ecology, which will certainly surpass social democracy’” (Le Monde 
2.12.2009) 
France is a part of the coalition of the EU in UN COP – meetings. The country holding 
the presidency of the Union co-ordinates member states and presents the EU-position in 
international negotiations. (Oberthur & Ott 1999, 13.)  In 2007 The European 
Commission announced an ambitious strategy to combat global warming by proposing 
to cut emissions by 20 % by 2020. This decision was especially critized by the 
European business world that worried about their competitiveness. France’s reaction 
was also somewhat reluctant: France’s president Nicolas Sarkozy argued initially that 
France should not have to meet up with these emissions reductions because of the 
widespread use of nuclear power that already lowers emissions levels. (Giddens 2011, 
196 - 197.) 
However, Sarkozy reversed his opinion in 2008 and, as France was the president in the 
European Council in the same year, Sarkozy managed to build a consensus between 
member states:  this lead to the acceptance of the Commission’s proposal. (Giddens 
2011, 196 - 197.) 
                                                
3 The content of Grenelle 1 and Grenelle 2 can be found at the Ministry’s website. 
((http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/La-politique-climatique-de-la.html.) 
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The Debate: climate change in the French Media 
According to recent studies, the media discussion about climate change in France has 
changed a lot after certain events. It is characterized more by uncertainties and 
controversial point of views that have huge public visibility in the media that in France 
seems to be more “climatoskeptic – friendly” than in other European countries 
nowadays. (Jurdant & Poupardin 2012; Aykut, Comby & Guillemot 2012.) 
In their article “Climate Change Controversies in the French mass media 1990-2010” 
(2012) Stefan Cihan Aykut, Jean-Baptiste Comby & Hélène Guillemot examine how 
climate change has evolved as a public problem in the French media and what kind of 
controversies has occurred since. Their data consists of three French publications 
(including Le Monde), television news and interviews with key actors from different 
domains. The writers distinguish three phases in the French case that have distinctive 
qualities regarding the role of scientists, policy makers, journalists and NGO’s in 
framing the issue and also the role of certain social processes.  
In phase one (1988–2001) climate change did not show much in France’s climate policy 
and also major newspapers remained very silent about it throughout the 90’s due to the 
poorly established field of environmental journalism; news attention occurred mainly 
during the Rio conference in 1992 and Kyoto Conference in 1997. The writers also state 
that the organization of expertise in France distanced climate change from public 
discussions, due to the confidentiality of many scientific reports and the technical 
language used. In the 90’s, French climate science was poorly organized and 
climatologists were not properly mobilized on the issue; this lead to popularisers in 
science and to the refusal of scientists to work with the IPCC or talk to the media 
system. French NGO’s were as well poorly organized, not promoting the issue that 
much. (Aykut, Comby & Guillemot 2012, 160-161.) 
In phase two (2001–2009) newspapers started to write more actively about climate 
change through domestic meteorological phenomena (winter storms in 1999, a heat 
wave in 2003) and political events (national climate plans in 2000 and 2004), as well as 
during international events like the publications of the IPCC reports (2001 & 2007). In 
this phase, the framing of climate change started to shift from international level to the 
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national level; it was considered as an issue to be dealt in the individual level through 
lifestyle changes and energy savings. Also, environmental journalism and the scientific 
community started to develop and organize. The tone of the debate became more 
impassioned and professionalized. (Aykut, Comby & Guillemot 2012, 161–162.) 
The writers argue that the debate is now in phase three: it is characterized by growing 
controversialism since the Copenhagen Summit in 2009; these controversies refer to 
different actors and themes like science and policy relationship, expertise and climate 
science and environmental ideology. One international event is significant, the so-called 
‘‘Climategate’’ resulting from the publication of leaked emails from the University of 
East Anglia, and the revelation of errors in the fourth IPCC assessment report 
concerning the melting of Himalayan glaciers. (Aykut, Comby & Guillemot 2012, 168–
169.) 
Domestic controversies were also given significant play in the media during the phase 
three, including the so-called Allègre – affair. Claude Allègre is a famous politician and 
scientist in France who is known for his climatoskeptic articles. In 2010, just two 
months after the Copenhagen Conference, he published a book called “Climatic 
imposture or the fake ecology”. This book was omnipresent in the French media and 
created resistance and anger in the French community of scientists, working within the 
IPCC framework. (Jurdant & Poupardin 2012, 1– 6.) 
In consequence, the relationship between science, media and politics has been taking 
new forms in France, forcing scientists to take up new strategies in introducing their 
findings to the public. Many journalists in Le Monde and Libération have also 
participated in this dispute. Bruno Latour ended up summarizing his views as well in Le 
Monde, stating that we cannot totally separate expert knowledge and politics; there 
should be a “good link” between them because of existing uncertainties in the world. 
(Jurdant & Poupardin 2012, 1– 6.) 
Still, Aykut, Comby & Guillemot argue, these events are not the causes for increasing 
media debate in themselves but have merely accelerated an on-going process as new 
actors with new world views and working methods are entering to the field of climate 
politics in the French media; scientific and environmental journalists are no longer the 
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only ones who shape the way climate change is treated by the media. The writers note 
that even in phase three, these controversies have mainly reached intellectual parts of 
the media field while they remain relatively absent from media platforms with larger 
audiences. (Aykut, Comby & Guillemot 2012, 168– 169.)  
The French political culture 
The local political culture is an environment that sets possibilities as well as limitations 
to the media system, civil society actors and the whole nature of the debate. Risto 
Alapuro, as well as other authors (e.g. Jepperson 2002; Rosanvallon 2007), has 
examined the differences of France’s and Finland’s associational life and political 
cultures. He argues that in France there are tensions within associational life between 
the forms of integration and contention.  
The organized mediation between the individual and the state has historically been 
rejected by the French state; in the 19th century, the state behaved in a very hostile way 
towards associations because they were seen as intermediary groups, threatening the 
social cohesion of the nation. These conflictual relations have continued to prevail to 
this day. This is also why it is typical for the French civil society to have contentious 
repertoires, focused on direct action instead of consensual relations to the state, as is the 
case in Finland. (Alapuro 2005, 379 – 383.)  
France is an old, centralized state with catholic traditions. Ronald L. Jepperson has 
examined different Modern Polity Models, which refer to the way the society is 
organized. Jepperson says that France is a good example of the anti-corporate 
reconstruction of society, belonging to the state – nation - model. This means that the 
French republican ideal of universalism has historically rejected organized group 
identities and caused tensions between the state and society to this day. In the strongly 
centralized state of France, people are first and foremost regarded as citizens – 
citoyen(ne)s. (Jepperson 2002, 72-73.) Alapuro and Jepperson thus argue that the 
relationship between the French state and the citizens is relatively conflictual. 
Pierre Rosanvallon (2007) has also written about the political culture in France and its 
implications to the relationship between the state and civil society: strong central 
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governing power in France and on the other hand, on	  the global, modern trend towards 
pluralism and decentralization and the growing role of grass roots level politics. This 
dynamic is presented in the contradiction between the particular and the general, 
between civil society and the state. However, Rosanvallon argues that the French case is 
actually much more vibrant and varied than presented in theory: actually, there have 
always existed these intermediary bodies and citizens have played an active role in 
many historical developments. (Rosanvallon 2007, 1-4).	  
This relationship has still given France’s civil society its own, distinctive mark: the 
French government has regularly emphasized its refusal to negotiate with civil society 
groups because they are many times considered to threaten the “general interest of 
people (Rosanvallon 2007). Following, France’s model lacks consensual basis and is 
marked with strong oppositional models and protests instead, a so-called Anti-étatisme 
(Jepperson 2002, 68 - 73). 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s right wing party L’UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) was in 
charge of the French politics during the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 and also during 
Durban in 2011.  The French had the regional elections coming up in March 2010 and 
the presidential elections in 2012. My hypothesis is that the domestic political situation 
and the differing climate political views between the Right and Left Wing parties such 
as the UMP, The Greens (Les Verts) and The Socialist Party (Le Parti Socialiste) will 
be visible in the articles and partly direct the course of discussions. 
3 Theoretical Perspective, Method and Data 
In this section I will present the specific theoretical framework of this study. I will point 
out the features of a fairly new theoretical framework used in political and moral 
sociology, justification theory, and what kind of new point of views and results we can 
obtain with it in relation to climate politics. This will lead us to the presentation of the 
specific research questions of this thesis and finally, to the description of the PJA - 
method and material. 
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3.1 Justifying Actions in Dispute Situations: Justification Theory 
My thesis aims at understanding the dynamics of the “king of environmental disputes”, 
climate change. With Boltanski and Thévenot’s justification theory (1991) I aim to 
highlight the dynamics of action and the critical capacity of actors in dispute situations 
that are not merely a matter of language; they include human persons and a large 
number of objects in the material world.  
The aim of Boltanski and Thévenot is to highlight the critical capacity of actors in 
opposition to social theory that emphasizes structural positions and group affiliations. 
These different forms of equivalence are not related to different groups – like in 
classical sociology – but to different situations. In social life people need to justify their 
actions and explicate the grounds on which new agreement can be built. Boltanski and 
Thévenot have developed a grammar for these modes of justification, these “orders of 
worth” are called Inspired, Domestic, Civic, Renown, Market, Industrial and Green. 
(Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 360–364.) 
These justification worlds are different in the following sense: firstly, they have 
different principles that are derived from classical, philosophical texts and secondly, the 
beings (persons and things) and their worth are different. In other words, people and 
objects relate to each other differently in these models. The Common Worlds have been 
constructed historically to describe justifications performed in majority of ordinary 
situations. The arguments’ systematicity can be found in political philosophy: the use of 
these texts is made in an instrumental fashion to clarify the constraints of actors.  
The common worlds are very shortly the following: In the world of inspiration, worth is 
distributed on the basis of creativity, artistic sensibility and imagination. Emotions and 
rebellion are valued as directing action. In the domestic world people’s worth depends 
on hierarchies and on a chain of personal dependencies; traditions are valued foremost. 
In the Renown world self-esteem and recognition by others are considered worthy. In 
the civic world, actors are considered to be members of a community in opposition to 
selfish individuals and particular interests; equity, collective action and procedural rules 
are valued. In the market world important persons are buyers and sellers; competitivness 
and wealth are considered to contribute to the common good. The industrial world 
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refers to planning, efficiency, expertise and measuring. (Boltanski & Thévenot 1999, 
369 – 373.) Finally the seventh world, the world of ecology, refers to actions and people 
that contribute to the well being of the environment (Thévenot, Moody & Lafaye 2000). 
Justification theory has also earlier been used to examine environmental disputes (e.g. 
Lamont & Thévenot 2000; Huikuri 2010). Michele Lamont, Laurent Thévenot and other 
contributors examine these disputes in France and The United States in “Rethinking 
comparative cultural sociology” (2000). They focus on the criteria that people use when 
trying to convince others in disputes; the plausibility and significance of these criteria 
vary in different national contexts. 
Theoretically this is made through the concept of “national cultural repertoires of 
evaluation”. This concept points to different cultural tools available in different national 
contexts. Empirically this is put to test by conducting case studies and by documenting 
different kind of criteria used by participants in disputes and conflict situations that 
generate passion or disagreement. (Lamont & Thévenot 2000, 1.) 
One of the book’s case studies concerns public environmental disputes. Thévenot, 
Moody and Lafaye use justification theory to analyse the claims and arguments made by 
different actors in these two countries; people usually have conflicting interpretations of 
the common good and what is valuable and worthy. Thévenot, Moody and Lafaye were 
able to identify cultural differences in evaluation and produce qualitatively nuanced and 
sensible results. These results demonstrate how people talk about the environment 
morally; do they use justifications based on the market, on technical efficiency and 
planning, on solidarity, on tradition or on ecological values? 
With this comparative analysis Thévenot and others were able to discover differences in 
political cultures and traditions of France and the U.S. For example, market evaluations 
are more often critized than endorsed, especially at the local level in France. Civic 
equality arguments were mostly combined with planning arguments in France, while 
civic arguments were usually combined with market justifications in the U.S. (Thévenot 
et al. 2000, 239–263.) Furthermore, Eeva Luhtakallio has compared Finnish and French 
practices of democracy and also ended up in same conclusions on the central role of 
civic justifications in the French political culture (Luhtakallio 2010, 197 – 199). 
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My objective is to discover and analyse these national specificities further in 
justification dynamics in the climate change debate in France. My aim is to find out 
more about the political culture in France, analysing the criteria of evaluation that are 
combined or that conflict each other in climate change related disputes. These criteria 
are related to different conceptions of the common good, they are used to define the 
polity and they also maintain a political community (Thévenot & Lamont 2000, 307). 
Finally, my specific research questions are the following: 
1. What kind of strategic actions, directed to the public sphere, do different kinds of 
actors pursue? What kind of claims do actors make in climate change related disputes 
and how do they justify them morally in order to convince or criticize other actors’ 
claims? 
2. What kind of solutions and measures are considered just and worthy in the 
governance of climate change? What are different actors’ conceptions of justice, in 
which ways do these conceptions differ and converge, and how do actors try to find 
common ground? 
3. What does the local civil society consider worthy and just in climate politics and how 
do their conceptions differ from those presented in the media debate?  
4. How is the French political culture visible in the argumentation? 
3.2 Public Justifications Analysis (PJA) 
PJA is a sociological research method that has been developed to study claims and 
moral justifications in public discussion. Social order in western democracies is based 
on the idea that citizens solve disputes peacefully and that all people are equal, despite 
of their many differences. These normative aspects mean empirically that we can study 
these dispute situations in which people are obliged to define the common good, take a 
stand in moral questions and solve many kinds of social problems in situations of 
disagreement. (Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2010, 34.) 
The strength of PJA is that it is at the same time universalistic and particularistic; the 
aim is to find common points of reference that surpass the boundaries of different 
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political cultures. The other side of the coin is that we are able to find specificities in 
political cultures and also in individual disputes. This way we can collect information 
about different conceptions of the common good in different political cultures. Finally 
we will be able to trace preconditions for a global discussion of climate politics. 
(Luhtakallio & Ylä-Anttila 2011, 35.) 
 
The building blocks for PJA have been taken from a methodology and from a theory. 
The methodology is called Political Claims Analysis, developed by Koopman & 
Statham in 1999. It is based on the definition of frames and it makes statistical analysis 
of framings, claims and claim makers on a particular topic (Luhtakallio 2010, 181). The 
theory stems in turn from current French pragmatism: justification theory and its orders 
of worth (Boltanski & Thévenot, 1991).  
The PJA approach uses some technical concepts and coding schemes from Political 
Claims Analysis. In PCA, the unit of analysis is a claim, which is defined as “a unit of 
strategic action in the public sphere”. A claim can be broken down into several variables 
like location, claimant, form (how it is inserted in the public sphere), object, addressee, 
issue and frame. A claim has to be political in nature in order to get coded and it has to 
refer to a collective social problem and offer a reason, solution or consequence for it. 
(Koopmans & Statham 1999, 2–6.) 
The PJA approach is not meant to code frames but justification types. In comparison to 
PCA, Public Justification Analysis is a much richer method to get data for my research 
questions. It allows making more qualitative reading of newspaper articles alongside the 
quantitative side and it is more sensitive to nuances. Qualitative sensitivity is very 
important since the objective is to find French specificities in the climate change debate.  
3.3 Combining Media Data with Interviews 
This study utilizes to types of data in order to maintain more comprehensive research 
results. How do the interviews reflect the newspaper articles and what kind of 
discursive differences are there to be found? What kind of moral and political 
dimension do actors emphasize in interviews and on the other hand, in articles? The 
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newspaper reports on a world political event that discusses global climate policy and at 
the same time, these civic groups act on a more local and concrete level that is partly 
neglected by the mainstream media. To understand this relationship and dynamic is one 
of the objectives for this study. 
Newspaper articles in Le Monde  
The purpose of studying newspaper articles is to grasp the national and global 
perspective by studying the arguments different actors have made in the media during 
the COP in Copenhagen (2009) and the COP in Durban (2011). Publicity is crucial to 
the functioning of democracy because it is a stage in which people solve moral disputes 
and common problems (Dewey 2006). I thus argue that newspaper articles are a fruitful 
way to study climate change debate because the media is an important arena for 
democratic discussion and moral disputes and an essential part of the public sphere in 
modern democracies. 
Le Monde was set up as a “newspaper of reference” for the country in 1944. Its 
organization is independent from political parties, even though its founder Hubert 
Beuve-Méry has described the paper as pursuing the goals of “social liberalism” or 
“liberal socialism”. (Kuhn 1995.) This has said to have a selective effect on the stories 
represented. Also Brossard and others found a significant number of stories in Le 
Monde stressing these social values such as limits to economic growth and the need to 
balance its relation to environmental protection (Brossard et al. 2004, 373). 
These conferences are chosen as time periods for the collection of data because the 
media writes actively about climate change during these conferences; thus, moral and 
political disputes about climate change are the most heated during these conferences and 
therefore the most varied and richest data can be assumed to be available.  
The Copenhagen conference was hugely mediatized and considered as a key event in 
resolving the issue of global warming; almost all actors were equipped with a “now or 
never – attitude”: speakers put all their ammunitions and efforts in trying to convince 
other speakers of their definitions of the common good and of just methods. Durban on 
the other hand was another case: The French had the presidential elections coming up in 
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2012, the financial crisis of Europe was again peaking and the discussions on euro 
bonds were dividing the EU. Climate change was not that visible in the media or in 
policy agendas.  
Interviews from French civil society actors 
Next, I will shortly present the NGO’s that were interviewed for the purposes of this 
research project in June 2012 in Paris by the researchers of HEPO. The descriptions of 
NGO’s below are gathered from the interviewees themselves and how they described 
their association and its activity. 
4D (Dossiers et Débats pour le Développement Durable) is a French association of 6 - 7 
employees that was founded in 1992. Its purpose is to create a citizen network for the 
promotion of sustainable practices and development as well as to follow states’ 
positions in international conferences. 4D belongs to the national network of 
environmental NGO’s (RAC) as well as to the global Climate Action Network (CAN). 
4D follows international negotiations actively and publishes a “note of decrypting” after 
the conferences. This publication is sent to mainly francophone networks. 4D also 
cooperates closely with a French solidarity association called Coordination Sud in 
development and adaptation issues. They participate to the meetings with the 
government (Grenelle) with the delegation led by the RAC. 4D is mainly working on 
regional issues in France and trying to define a horizontal system of governance that 
would allow taking ordinary citizens more into discussions. 
Vélorution is a French bicycle association based in Paris. Their objective is to reduce 
car traffic and pollution. They describe themselves as a tight community, even “a way 
of life”. They also oppose clientilism and support self-management and participation 
instead. They organize many kinds of activities in Paris like “critical masses” and do 
lobbying in the city’s bicycle committee. Although climate change is not the main 
theme in their activity.  
Attac (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financière et l'Aide aux Citoyens) 
was founded in France in 1998; it calls for alternative globalization and promotes a 
more just, democratic world. They are against money power and free trade and promote 
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taxes on financial transactions and bans on fiscal paradises for the benefit of citizens. 
Even though Attac is an international network of associations it is not a centrally 
organized association; consequently, different groups of Attac vary in their themes and 
emphasises both nationally and within nations.  
Nowadays, Attac France is concentrated on two things. Firstly, they have a 
commission called “ecology and society” that is trying to combine ecological and social 
justice issues and secondly, a commission that works on European politics, stability 
pacts and budgetary issues. 
Attac France belongs to the Climate Justice Now! – network which was created in 2007 
when Friends of the Earth international decided to leave CAN because they were not 
satisfied with its positions and methods4. In climate politics, their idea is to coordinate 
different kinds of local initiatives and mobilizations and to emphasize the importance of 
local collectives.  
Greenpeace on the other hand is an international NGO with a central office in 
Amsterdam where the program and main lines come from. Currently, the priority 
number one is climate change. Greenpeace France has 5 persons working in climate 
and energy issues, two in nuclear and three in challenges concerning energy - efficiency 
and renewable energy resources. The French office is more centred on France and 
Brussels; they try to put pressure on the French decision makers and through that affect 
decision making in the European level. They do lobbying in the field of energy policy 
and have especially critized the wide use of nuclear power and emphasized its dangers. 
Greenpeace France has participated to the Grenelle but its relationship with the state has 
become more confrontational after the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan. 
According to the representative of GP France, the pro-nuclear government does not 
allow discussions on nuclear power but concentrates on more consensual issues like 
energy saving and energy efficiency. 
                                                
4 In France the national network is called Urgence Climatique Justice Sociale, created in 2009. It was the 
result of 2 years work with different NGO’s to combine ecological and social issues together. 
 
 
  30 
3.4 Coding scheme 
By using the PJA – method, I aim to make a quantitative overview of the main 
justification types used by different actors in the French media debate during the 
Copenhagen and Durban COP’s. The researchers in Helsinki Group of Political 
Sociology have developed the scheme during the years 2010-2012 and I have also 
participated in the process during the year 20125. 
The searched time period for the data is seven days before, during and after the 
conference. The search terms were changement climatique OU changement du climat 
OU réchauffement climatique OU effet du serre OU copenhague/durban. Sample dates 
were followingly 30/11-25/12/2009 for Copenhagen and 21/11-16/12/2011 for Durban. 
The coding of an article starts by identifying claims: only claims that address climate 
politics are coded. Claims reported in the newspaper are coded up to a maximum of 
three months back in time. A claim is a unit of action in the public sphere that some 
actor has made in order to influence other actors and the public opinion. A claim is 
usually verbal action but it can also be physical action like manifestations, performances 
and strikes; the newspaper merely reports of this claim. (Koopmans & Statham 1999, 
203 – 222.) 
The articles are divided into two categories on the basis of whether they discuss climate 
politics or climate science.  
In PJA, a claim also has a speaker, speaker area and an addressee. Speaker areas are 
local, national and international. Countries are also divided into northern and southern 
hemisphere countries according to the different annexes in the Kyoto Protocol where 
emissions cuts are distributed in accordance to the common but differentiated 
responsibility - principle. The aim of this division is to examine the relations and 
different justification types between the global north and the global south. Speaker 
hemisphere can also be paper country: this category helps to identify which claims 
come from France in contrast to other national entities. 
                                                
5 For detailed information of the coding process, see codebook: http://bit.ly/UBZvst and reliability report: 
http://bit.ly/VF8M4N. 
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The addressee refers to the actor who is “receiving” the message. It is coded only if it is 
explicitly mentioned; otherwise the addressee is coded as no addressee, which basically 
refers to the public opinion. 
Only one claim per one actor is coded per article. The coding rules are quite precise to 
improve the inter-coder reliability and to achieve reliable quantitative data for the 
analysis. The articles are also dealt with qualitatively to grasp all the nuances and details 
of the French debate. 
In the coding scheme, only two main justifications used per speaker end up coded. This 
means that the speaker may use several justification types to support his/her claim but 
quantitatively only 2 main types are coded. That doesn’t mean that other justifications 
types are left without notice; they are reflected in the analysis in a more qualitative 
fashion. 
In the PJA – coding scheme, the civic world is divided into three categories to better 
differentiate and specify the climate political argumentation that stems from the civic 
world. Civic democracy refers to claims that emphasize the importance of global 
negotiations and co-operation in tackling a global environmental issue like the climate 
change. Civic legal refers to achieving a legally binding contract to control global 
warming and to reduce GHG emissions, in this case usually referring to the continuation 
of the Kyoto Protocol. Civic justice refers to burden sharing and to the unequally 
distributing effects of global warming between the Northern and Southern countries. It 
also refers to the future generations.  
The domestic world refers to the appreciation of national or other traditions, local ways 
of life, personal affiliations and proximity. The world of ecology is divided into two 
categories. The first, ecological justification refers to the objects in the material 
environment (trees, oceans, animals, plants etc) and to claims that consider nature 
worthy in itself. Claims were given an ecological justification only if the claim 
explicitly referred to the objects in nature. The ecological anthropocentric refers to the 
impacts of global warming to human populations like droughts, floods, extreme weather 
conditions and the rise of the sea level.  
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The industrial world, industrial justification can refer to the appreciation of climate 
science and the use of scientific, calculable facts in argumentation. It can also refer to 
efficiency, planning, engineering and to developing green technologies as a solution to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change. 
The market world, market justification, refers to finding solutions that are most market 
friendly; most efficient solutions are those that are the least costing and those that do not 
harm economic growth. Carbon trading is a mechanism widely supported by business 
actors whereas the carbon tax is usually critized by actors who privilege market worth; 
from the point of view of markets, taxation is often regarded as harmful, punitive 
regulation by state authorities.  
Fame justification refers to the world of renown where the acceptance and recognition 
of the great public is considered valuable. Inspirational justification refers to arguments 
that value resourcefulness, originality and emotional devotion and it refers to artistic 
work like pieces of art and literature. 
In addition to the justification types, the coding scheme includes different kinds of tags, 
which help to identify different kinds of themes in the material. In this study, the flags 
are green technology and liberal grammar. Liberal grammar refers to nation states 
calculating their own interests and resorting to the principle of national sovereignty. In 
most cases in the climate change debate, liberal grammar is used in a negative manner 
to denounce other actors of maximizing own interests and playing along the logics of 
power politics. 
Justifications can be used in a positive manner or in a negative manner (denouncement) 
and also in combinations. Boltanski and Thévenot mention at least two ways to do this. 
In compromise two justification worlds and their criteria of the common good are 
combined, or forced together. In denunciation the criteria of another justification world 
is questioned from the point of view of another justification world. (Boltanski & 
Thévenot 1999, 373 – 376.) 
When coding with PJA, it is important to keep in mind the specific context of the study. 
In the climate political debate the use of the market world was sometimes hard to 
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identify and this is why the political context must always be regarded before making 
any theoretical conclusions. One explain of this is taxing; it is a mechanism that 
happens through the market but still it can be regarded as disturbing the functions of the 
market.  In the climate change debate however, the carbon tax is seen as democratic 
regulation of the market and therefore was decided to be coded as a combination of 
civic democracy and industrial justification: carbon tax is seen as democratic regulation 
of the global economy. PJA is a pragmatist approach that tries to grasp the specific 
situation that is embedded in a socio - political context.  
4 Analysis I: Figures from the Media Debate 
This first analysis chapter will present the quantitative results of this study. Altogether, I 
analysed 116 articles during the Copenhagen COP and 49 articles during the Durban 
COP: in total 165 articles. For the most part, the discussion was lead in a political 
manner (85 % of all claims) and purely scientific claims seem to stay at the marginal 
(15 % of all claims). 
4.1 Speakers and Areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 The speakers are quantified by the number of claims they made in the media debate. The total number 
therefore refers to the overall number of claims made in the debate. 
Table 1: Speakers in the media debate during the Copenhagen and Durban 
COP's (%)6 
Speaker Copenhagen Durban 
Government 26 24 
Journalist 19 13 
Civic organization 15 15 
Expert 12 21 
Intergovernmental organization 8 15 
Multiple governments 6 3 
Politician / Party 5 6 
Business 5 1 
Other 4 2 
Total 100 100 
N 202 97 
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It is easy to spot the most visible speakers in Le Monde’s debate: first governments and 
then journalists, civic organizations and experts. Other actors’ claims, including 
officials, police, artists and economic organizations counted only for 2 - 4 % of all 
claims so they have been combined into one single category. 
It is not a surprise that individual governments’ voice is the most strongest since they 
are decisive actors in the UN Conferences and since their statements, often addressed in 
the form of demands to other individual governments, are important from the view point 
of how the negotiations evolve and what kind of results are to be expected. 
Journalists’ voice is very visible in the material, consisting of news reportages and 
comments where they express their viewpoints quite strongly: other studies have shown 
that journalists participated globally very actively during the Copenhagen COP, and saw 
it as a cosmopolitan project (see e.g. Kunelius 2012). This notion is no exception to 
journalists in Le Monde who tended to use civic arguments and denounced the 
Copenhagen COP as “a deception”, “an apocalypse” and “a fiasco”. 
However, journalists’ voice became less visible in the Durban COP and instead experts’ 
voice started to grow stronger; 20 % of all claims were made by experts. This might 
imply that climate change did not need that much scientific affirmation as it needed 
political and moral reflection at the time of the Copenhagen COP. During the Durban 
COP experts’ voice is on the other hand almost as strong as governments, exceeding the 
claims made by journalists who were less eager to promote their point of views during 
the Durban conference.  
The global civil society is also quite visible; their claims count for 15 % of all claims. 
They were often interviewed and asked to comment on different climate political issues. 
This indicates that journalists see NGO’s as some kind of authorities and experts on 
environmental questions.  
Business actors, on the other hand, made surprisingly few public statements in the Le 
Monde, especially during the Durban summit. The few statements were usually in the 
form of business leader writing a comment about climate politics from the viewpoint of 
his/her firm and the economic sector in which the firm operates. Despite of few 
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comments from the business world, these articles were still the most interesting and 
fruitful in the material; business leaders emphasized the weakness and restrictiveness of 
the UN negotiating procedures and in contrast, argued that more professional, effective 
and quicker actions are made at the local and regional levels. 
Actors from the northern hemisphere were dominant in the reporting of Le Monde: 25 
% of all claims came from the northern hemisphere whereas only 15 % of all claims 
come from the southern hemisphere. The division and different visibility of Northern 
and Southern actors is in this light unquestionable. Northern and southern actors made 
20 % of claims together. The most significant and interesting division, however, seems 
to be between national – French – actors, and all other actors; 40 % of all claims came 
from French actors, which is a big proportion. 
It is not very common for claim makers to explicitly address other actors: No addressee 
could be identified for 60 % of claims. This means that most claims in are addressed to 
the public opinion instead of a specific, explicit addressee. Most claims that had 
addressees were addressed to multiple governments, usually to the world leaders in the 
COP’s or just to a group of governments.  
About 10 % of all claims were addressed to individual governments. The most popular 
addressees in this case were China and the U.S; their actions and concessions were 
considered as a key dimension in the ultimate success of the negotiations. Especially in 
the after reporting of the Copenhagen summit, they were denounced of negotiating in 
small, closed circles with other main emerging countries and biggest industrialized 
countries. Denmark was also addressed relatively often as an individual government: it 
received a lot of criticism about the democratic nature of its negotiation procedures 
during the Copenhagen COP.    
The most popular claim type in the material was statement: 60 % of claims were of this 
type. Most often individual governments, concerning their own positions and 
motivations in Copenhagen or denouncing other countries actions, made them. The 
second most common claim type was comment (20 %), which refers to articles written 
by a single author, usually a journalist, expert, politician, civil society or business actor. 
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Demonstrations, which refer to the methods of the civil society, were coded only a few 
times. Scientific reports or publications counted for only 4 % of all claims. 
4.2 Justifications 
Below is the chart of main justification types coded from the media debate: 
Table 4: Main justification types in the media debate (%) (N= Copenhagen 276; Durban 
111.)7 
 
The most commonly used justification types in the French media were the industrial 
justification, civic democracy justification and the civic justice justification. Ecological 
justification, when actors refer explicitly to the objects in nature (like rainforests, 
animals, biodiversity) was also relatively common. 
It is worth noting that main justifications were used mainly in a positive sense; 
quantitatively, I only coded a couple of claims where the conceptions of a certain 
common world were clearly denounced: these were mainly negative market 
justifications. Actors’ avoidance of denouncing other actors could be explained by the 
factor that speakers are more careful in the climate change debate in the media: speakers 
                                                
7 The category “other” includes the inspiration and fame justifications, security – code as well the 
category no justification. 
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choose not to present too provocative arguments or arguments that clearly and explicitly 
denounce some other actor’s criteria of the common good.   
In respect to differences between the Copenhagen and Durban material, the results 
started to saturate quite quickly relating to the use of justifications. However, there are 
some differences between the COP’s regarding the popularity of certain justifications. 
Firstly, claims that demand a legally binding treaty are relatively more popular in the 
Durban material. This is most probably explained by the fact that the Kyoto Protocol 
was ending in 2012 so there were many speakers that wished for its continuity. 
Secondly, ecological arguments are much fewer in the Durban material and focusing 
mainly on the impacts on human populations like food security, agriculture and rising 
sea levels. Instead, market arguments have grown popularity in the French media debate 
during the Durban COP. Although during Durban, business actors remained silent 
themselves: there was only one claim from them. 
In the light of my findings, by the Durban conference climate change had exited the 
public spotlight at least in comparison with the Copenhagen media hype, and it was 
forced to give space to more “acute” problems like financial problems and discussions 
on nuclear power. Overall, climate change reporting was relatively very visible and 
numerous in Le Monde during both of these conferences in comparison for example to 
the American newspaper New York Times’s coverage (see Korpivaara 2013). 
Acting according to the liberal grammar was denounced 12 times during the 
Copenhagen Summit but only 1 time in the Durban Summit when Canada decided to 
leave the Kyoto Protocol, justifying its decision by stating that staying in the Protocol 
(realizing emissions reductions) would cost it too much (referring to the market world). 
In the French debate, domestic, inspiration and fame arguments were strikingly few; 
they clearly do not belong to the French tool kit, at least in the climate change debate.  
When we compare these finding to those obtained from the U.S., there are some crucial 
differences. In the U.S. market justifications counted for 15 % of all justifications where 
as in France they counted for only 5 % of all justifications during the Copenhagen COP, 
although almost 15 % during the Durban COP. The use of civic justice argument was 
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also less common in the American debate and instead the use of fame argument was 
much more relevant. (Korpivaara 2013, 31.) 
Below is a cross – table of speakers and justification types: How are the justification 
types and speakers interrelated: can we see specific tendencies and logics on the use of 
justification types between different actors? 
 
Table 1: Speakers by main justification types (%) in Le Monde during the 
Copenhagen COP-meeting (2009) 
 
Justification Speaker 
 Government Journalist Civic organization Expert 
Industrial 21 25 10 69 
Civic democracy 35 29 35 14 
Civic justice 16 5 15 3 
Civic legal 5 10 2 0 
Ecological 7 4 30 3 
Eco_anthropocentric 7 4 2 3 
Market 6 2 2 7 
Fame 2 4 0 0 
Inspiration 0 0 2 1 
No justification 1 17 2 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Governments and civic organizations are clearly keener to use the civic justice argument 
than other actors. The use of ecological justification clearly belongs to the 
argumentation of environmental NGO’s where as for other actors it is much less 
common. Unsurprisingly, experts use industrial arguments the most.  
Below are the most common combination types in the French media debate. I found 9 
market implies eco – combinations which refers to market mechanisms that are 
developed to contribute to the wellbeing of the environment, including carbon trading 
and the UN REDD – program. Also, when the worlds of ecology and market are put 
into compromise, actors often refer to conceptions such as green growth and green 
economy. Green technology was an even more common combination type and it refers 
to the compromise between the worlds of ecology and industrial. 
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5 Analysis II: French Specificities in the Media Debate 
I will next discuss the utilization of justification types in Le Monde in a qualitative 
fashion; what lies behind these figures? The purpose is to find French specificities in the 
debate. The first chapter will concentrate on the different dimensions of the civil world 
since it is so dominant and essential in the French context: about 40 % of all 
justification types were based on the civil world during both COP-meetings. I will also 
reflect its relationship to other worlds of justification in the climate change debate: with 
which orders or worth does the civil world on the one hand converge and make 
compromises with and on the other hand denounce and criticize? 
I will then move on to the second common justification type in the French debate, the 
industrial world: about 27 % of all claims stemmed from this world. Industrial 
arguments were very rarely used alone but mostly in combinations with other types of 
justification, especially with civic arguments. Scientific articles make an exception in 
this case.  
Finally, I will reflect the role of market justifications in the media debate: overall, their 
use was at the marginal, comprising only 6 % of all claims during the Copenhagen COP, 
and just like industrial justifications, they were quite rarely used as a main justification 
type but instead were used as a way to boost ones arguments.  
5.1 Civic World at the Heart of the French Debate 
As presented in the coding scheme, the civic world is divided into three categories to fit 
the climate change debate. No speaker explicitly denied the value of the civic world in 
public discussions or argued that global negotiations should be stopped altogether: the 
divergences touched mainly on the efficacy of existing democratic institutions and 
procedures in producing outcomes for the benefit of the environment, and what could be 
done at alternative levels while the international level is failing. Overall, the civic world 
was considered to be a positive force against free riding and power politics. 
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The necessity of a global agreement to control climate change 
The justification civic democracy was the most used in argumentation stemming from 
the civic world. It was the main justification type of governments, journalists, NGO’s 
and politicians. Actors argued that only global, joint efforts and a common agreement 
would tackle a global problem like climate change. Speakers highlighted the importance 
of co-operation that surpasses national boundaries and interests.  
In the beginning of conferences, speakers tend to be more positive and hopeful in their 
argumentation and some are even denying the possibility of failure: the pressure to 
succeed was very evident especially in the Copenhagen case. Below a French journalist 
comments on the Copenhagen Summit before its official beginning: 
“A simple political declaration would be a failure. Still, the game is open … in relation to 
traditional diplomatic game, which only considers the balance of power one particular 
dimension is worth considering: this is a truly global interest that is at stake. No player 
can expect to win in the case of a general failure. " (Journalist, Le Monde, December 6, 
2009) 
“The most crucial point is that we have never had this many head of states and 
governments around a negotiation table. They now have the knife on their throats and the 
obligation to succeed.” (Chantal Jouanno, France’s minister of Ecology [government], Le 
Monde, December 15, 2009) 
However, even though almost all speakers wished for a global agreement in 
Copenhagen and Durban, most speakers started to show scepticism towards the success 
of the negotiations very soon. As the climate change conference in Copenhagen evolved, 
there started to emerge obstacles and problems that begun to crumble the original 
hopeful attitude and the success of achieving a global agreement. Journalists argued that 
the situation is blocked and that it is very difficult to open the knots and to get out of it. 
One important way of using civic justifications was to criticize the whole democratic 
nature of the UN negotiation process. Especially the developing countries did this and 
accused Denmark for negotiating in small, closed committees. In the beginning of the 
negotiations, the host country Denmark made a draft as a proposition for the final 
agreement and this draft circulated in the midst of the countries delegations before the 
Summit. The Southern countries and NGO’s denounced the draft and argued that it was 
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illegitimate and disrespectful towards democratic negotiations and presenting mainly 
the interests of rich, northern countries. The Danish chief negotiator Connie Hedegaard 
was very defensive against these accusations and stated that Denmark is “only doing its 
job” (Le Monde, December 9, 2009). The NGO’s were also disappointed on the 
democratic procedures of the meeting since their participation was restricted a lot.  
It is clear that actors disagreed on the situation and if the negotiations meet the criteria 
of the civic world. The final accord was also criticized: countries like Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela were disappointed at the fashion how bigger countries 
negotiated in small, closed cabinets: the agreement was denounced for being the 
signature of the “G2”, USA and China. As a result the G77, led by China, India, Brazil, 
South Africa and Soudan, prepared their own text as a response to the Danish text. In 
this text the developing and emerging countries emphasize the obligations of rich 
countries towards the poor ones and the prolongation of the Kyoto Protocol. They also 
claim to be ready in making emissions reductions as a compromise. 
As the negotiations were drawing to a close in Copenhagen, denouncing the selfish 
games of state actors started to gain ground. The negative use of liberal grammar 
increased a lot towards the end of the conference. Liberal grammar refers to the 
influence of international power politics and actors maximizing their own interests. 
Civic democracy was usually used as a positive force against this kind of competition 
and free riding. In this context, many speakers denounced the states of maximizing their 
own interest as sovereign states from the civil world.  French journalists in Le Monde 
express their concerns: 
“But the fear is that some countries choose to neglect common efforts to instead win in 
competitiveness in global trade, at least in terms of price. This would be a way to prosper 
in comparative advantage … This strategy would encourage to delocalize polluting 
activities into countries hosting intensive modes of production energy, raw materials and 
that are indifferent to any constraints of recycling or protection of public health.”  
“The American – Chinese Realpolitik left a suffocating curtain of smoke behind.” 
(Journalist, Le Monde, December 19, 2009) 
The states accused each other for acting in an unconstructive and harmful manner. 
Especially China, USA and India took the biggest hit of accusations. A French expert 
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comments this final situation, fuelled by power relations between different blocs of 
countries: 
“So what happened? Europe defended its ambitious objectives that it did not know how 
to promote. Europe was marginalized by a coalition that represents the power political 
relations of today’s world: The USA, China, Brazil and South Africa. China is in the core 
of the failure in Copenhagen. For reasons of economic competitiveness, Peking will not 
allow environmental restrictions to its industry. But, even more, China cannot accept the 
idea of international control in its own territory … The Americans are still very 
indifferent towards climate change. And the Chinese government is not democratically 
elected. The pressure is very weak for these leaders from within their own nation and this 
poses a real problem for the planet.” (Le Monde, December 20, 2009) 
After the failure at the global level, the media debate started to change course: speakers 
reflected what could be done at the local and national level since the pace of action at 
the global level seems to be so frustratingly difficult and slow?  The problem seemed to 
crystallize into the following question: how to find the right balance between objective, 
scientific information and political imperatives? Proposed solutions varied from 
emphasizing the importance of local collectives and individual consumption choices to 
innovations in green technologies and a real involvement of large companies and SMEs. 
A French industrial boss comments as well on this theme: 
“Should we just wait for the catastrophe until we start implementing effective measures? 
I don’t think so, and a lot of industrials agree with me. Even in the absence of 
international agreements, we can act in all levels starting now! … We shouldn’t wait for 
the salvation from the top. Let’s not take the immense difficulties in Copenhagen as an 
excuse for putting off things for tomorrow that we could do even today. Let’s act now, in 
all levels, with our capacities!” (Pierre-André de Chalendar, General Director of Saint 
Gobain [business], Le Monde, December 3, 2009.) 
It is interesting to notice that even business actors all use arguments stemming from the 
civic world even though not as main justifications. The use of the civic justification can 
therefore be seen as constraining the French actors; all the actors all obliged to say 
something about it if they want to convince other speakers in public debates. The 
business actors’ were in favour of a global agreement and many of them said that they 
“will do their fair share in the collective effort”. 
During the Copenhagen conference, a French industrial defends his /hers own domain, 
the beef industry, and the importance of local and regional production. The industrial 
uses concepts from the civic world such as “the citizen with rights and duties” and how 
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everyone must contribute to the common good and reflect on the consequences of one’s 
individual actions. He points to ecological values as well: 
”It is everyone’s right to be vegetarian, breeder, welfarist, ecologist… But it is 
everyone’s duty to contribute in finding solutions to the enormous environmental 
challenge; they are never simple or sectarian but always complex and therefore not that 
media-friendly in this reductive society that is deaf to nuances.  
It is not a clash of greed and ideologies, beliefs, clichés or money that will save humanity, 
it is a real awareness of the challenge and a reasonable political will … Our model of 
beef production is an excellent territorial, environmental, cultural, economic and social 
project; it is a citizen project where the industry is committed to follow the route of 
sustainable beef.” (Denis Sibille, President of l'interprofession bovine, ovine, equine 
[Economic organization], Le Monde, December 12, 2009) 
In Durban, on the other hand, the results of negotiations were received in mixed feelings. 
All the state actors expressed huge satisfaction with this result and emphasized the 
importance of achieving even small steps in the process towards global consensus. 
There was a huge controversy between different actors’ opinion about the final outcome 
of the negotiations: clearly, for the states, the result was a huge diplomatic success, but 
what comes to really combatting climate change and protecting the environment, not so 
much. The NGO’s and journalists denounced the conference, stating that the states 
listened to the polluters instead of the people. The claimed fiasco was crowned by 
Canada’s decision to leave the Kyoto Protocol, justifying its decision by stating that 
staying in the Protocol (realizing emissions reductions) would cost it too much. 
Legally binding emissions reductions and the continuation of the KP 
The justification civic legal refers to a speaker demanding a legally binding contract to 
regulate emissions reductions. A mere political agreement is seen as insufficient. 
Southern countries were especially of the opinion that the rich countries should respect 
their engagements and continue along the line of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The use of this justification type was more common during the Durban conference. 
After both conferences, many speakers expressed their disappointment towards UN and 
its capability to pose legally constraining environmental regulation. 
There were also business leaders that hoped for a legally binding contract: the German 
businesses argued that a clearer set of rules would encourage investors to invest in green 
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businesses. After the Durban Conference, Canada decided to leave the KP because it 
would have cost it too much; Canada’s arguments stemmed from the market world and 
denounced the civil world’s legally binding restrictions instead.  
Climate justice 
“To establish an analogy between our current way of life and slavery permits to approach 
the climate question from a different point of view and encourage action (because nobody 
wants to identify himself as an enslaver.) … The future generations will ask themselves 
how our generation could have lived in such a moral blindness.” (Jean-François Mouhot 
[expert], Le Monde, November 28, 2011) 
The above quote is an example of the use of the civic justice argument. A French 
historian, in the role of an expert, is comparing the extensive use and dependency of 
fossil fuels to slavery; the burning of fossil fuels affects future generations and is 
already killing people all around the world, in the form of global warming and its 
impacts. He says that every living individual is indirectly responsible to the death of 
thousands of people and should therefore reflect the consequences of his / her actions 
from a moral point of view. 
Overall, the theme of climate justice was very present in the articles. This concept stems 
from the values of the civic world in which solidarity, equity and the reduction of 
inequalities are considered worthy.  
The civic justice - justification was mainly used in four different senses in the climate 
change debate; either, the justification was used in the sense that the northern countries 
bear historical responsibility of emitting GHG-emissions into the atmosphere or, in the 
sense that northern countries are more rich: they have more financial capacities to 
prevent climate change so they should do more and finance the mitigation and 
adaptation processes of poorer countries in the Southern hemisphere also facilitate their 
access to technology transfers. Third way was to emphasize future generations and their 
right to a clean and safe environment. Forthly, speakers emphasized the unevenly 
distributing effects of global warming between the northern and southern countries. 
Especially the Southern countries think that the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility of the Kyoto Protocol, which divides the responsibilities differently 
between rich and poor countries should be maintained in the following agreements. 
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They also demand financial aid from rich countries: for the representatives of poor 
countries this carries a moral as well as a technical dimension: 
“The rich countries should be obliged to pay; it is not charity but their duty because they 
have historically caused global warming. They must pay for the sins they have 
committed…”  (Mr Onduri, Ugandan official and representative of the least developed 
countries, Le Monde, December 12, 2009) 
 
India has been very unyielding in emphasizing the historical responsibility of northern 
countries. It demands equity to the battle against climate change and with China, 
emphasizes its right to economic development and lower emissions reduction rates: 
“The notion of equity should be at the heart of negotiations … The voluntary 
engagements that we have taken represent an enormous effort, considering that our 
country is facing considerable social needs. We are not rewarded for it. (Jayanti 
Natarajan, Indian minister of environment [government], Le Monde, December 7, 2009) 
Overall, civic justice – arguments seem to belong to the French style of argumentation 
very strongly. The French government and the French NGO’s emphasized this 
dimension especially during the Copenhagen Summit; they pointed towards the need to 
show more solidarity towards the Southern countries and the need to make 
compromises:  
“Europe and the rich countries, we must accept that our responsibility is heavier than others … 
our engagement must therefore be stronger … Who dares to say that Africa and other poor 
countries do not need the money? … Who dares to say that we do not need an organization to 
monitor the respect of engagements?” (Nicolas Sarkozy [government], Le Monde, December 17, 
2009) 
“By leaving Kyoto [the protocol] Harpers government [Canada] is condemning the most 
vulnerable populations of the world to death. It is a prove that this government prefers protecting 
the interests of polluters more than populations.” (Greenpeace Canada [NGO], Le Monde 
December 13, 2011) 
As we can see, questions of reducing inequalities between as well as within nations are 
firmly connected to environmental issues. Many speakers underlined the fact that social 
and environmental issues are intertwined and that we cannot even talk about 
environmental problems without addressing social inequalities. 
In one article, France’s Minister of Ecology, Jean-Louis Borloo, is also cited. He says 
that the future of the human kind is at stake in Copenhagen, referring to the worlds of 
civil justice and the green world:  
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“We have to return to a socially and ecologically responsible world in comparison of the 
20th century’s anonymous society”. (Jean-Louis Borloo, French Minister of Ecology 
[government], Le Monde, December 1, 2009) 
However, while the NGO’s continued to promote climate justice in Durban, France’s 
official statements become more harsh and demanding towards the developing countries 
by the time of the Durban Conference. France’s official climate ambassador, Serge 
Lepeltier, states about the emerging countries:  
“These countries are nowadays very reluctant to engage in an international agreement and they 
consider that the responsibility is solely within the developed countries. This is one of the 
challenges to overcome in Durban: 10 years ago this argumentation would have been realistic 
but now, their [emerging countries] emission rates are at a level where they cannot deny their 
own responsibility in the process of global warming.”(Serge Lepeltier, French Climate 
Ambassador [government], Le Monde 2009) 
Taxation was a popular solution to combat these inequalities. A French leftist politician 
is promoting the concept of green economy and how to make polluting activities less 
profitable than environment-friendly activities through the introduction of carbon tax; 
he is arguing for socially and environmentally responsible taxation of the markets: 
”The fight against climate change – in addition to resolving the ecological challenge – must open 
up new perspectives on social redistribution in the national and global level that traditional 
taxation systems and current policies have failed to support. In dealing with the ecological 
question, we must resolutely act in the social field as well. It must be the fight of the left.” 
(Michel Destot, French Politician, Le Monde, December 17, 2009) 
Dimensions of the industrial world 
Arguments based on industrial arguments were second most popular in the material; 
almost a third of all arguments in the media debate during the Copenhagen and Durban 
conferences were of this kind; in addition, nearly all actors referred to industrial 
justifications to make their arguments more credible. In the French case, the industrial 
justification gets a special characteristic when it is combined to the civic world; this 
way it can refer to the implementation of carbon tax and to effective governance of 
emissions through a global institution.   
The industrial world covers therefore many varied dimensions in the context of the 
climate change debate. Firstly, the industrial justification is used when discussing 
climate science and the use of scientifically proven facts in argumentation. The reports 
of the IPCC were considered a high authority in this context. Articles written by experts 
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that discussed only climate science and did not involve political demands or moral stand 
points were also given the industrial justification.  
Secondly, green technology was considered to be one of the main solutions to 
mitigating the effects of climate change and in adapting to it: promoting energy-
efficient, new technologies and investment in this domain. A manager in a GreenTech – 
enterprise states that technology will decarbonize, dematerialize and dehydrate the 
economy: 
“How to detox economy that is drugged with carbon without new modes of production? 
How to get out of the “business as usual” without changing habitual technologies? 
Without innovation, we cannot escape the dilemma of growth and pollution and 
stagnation or protection of environment. It’s by encouraging human inventiveness that we 
produce more goods and services with less energy, fewer materials and less 
environmental impact.” (Antoine Frérot, General Manager of Veolia Environnement 
[business], Le Monde, December 12, 2009) 
Industrial arguments that were in favour of green technologies were often supported 
with market justifications: investing in green technology will enhance economic growth 
and stop the financial stagnation that started in 2008. In this way climate friendly and 
market friendly practices are not mutually exclusive but support each other. 
During the Durban conference the discussions on nuclear power were very visible in Le 
Monde’s news reporting; the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan had suffered huge 
damages during the tsunami in March and evoked visible and heated discussions in 
nuclear dependent France. In Le Monde, the climate change related articles touched on 
the issue in the following sense: how France could exit from nuclear power and what 
kind of alternative energy resources should be favoured? 
Thirdly, the industrial argument refers to state planning and monitoring: actors propose 
that states should monitor emissions and plan their reduction within a certain time 
period; almost everybody repeated the well-known mantra that “we should stop the 
global warming to a maximum increase of 2 degrees”. 
Lastly, claims that demanded global environmental regulation and the setup of an 
international environmental organization were also coded as belonging to the industrial 
world and were relatively common in the French debate. Speakers who thought that 
UN’s current negotiation system is weak and ineffective presented these kinds of 
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demands of an environmental organization with real power and surveillance power: this 
way countries emissions reduction plans and their implementation would be transparent 
which also refers to the civic world. Especially NGO’s argued for this kind of 
democratic organization but also the French government and journalists: Sarkozy 
claimed that “he will fight to death” to establish international environmental governance 
(Le Monde, December 8, 2009). 
The carbon tax, which is in the coding scheme regarded as a combination of the civic 
democracy and industrial justification, can be seen as a moral cognitive world view 
where democratic regulation of markets is considered to reduce negative externalities 
produced by the market. Supporters of carbon tax argue that it would encourage 
companies to move towards less polluting energy resources. 
5.2 Clashes between the World of Ecology and the Market World 
In this chapter, I will first analyse the use of the ecological justification. Then I will 
move to justification stemming from the market world and argue that market arguments 
are mainly in the role of supportive arguments in the climate change debate in France. 
Finally I will examine the ways in which the market world and the green world clash; 
this tension was quite manifest in the French media debate and it heated up various 
domestic political discussions in France. 
Protection of environment overrides everything else 
Ecological justifications were very commonly used during the Copenhagen Conference; 
17 % of all justification types stemmed from the green world while 11 % during the 
Durban Conference. Especially environmental NGO’s justified their claims from this 
world: 30 % of their claims were of this kind. They pointed out to the threat of climate 
change to biodiversity, deforestation and soil erosion.  
The ecological anthropocentric justification that emphasizes the impacts of climate 
change to human populations was on the other hand most commonly used by 
intergovernmental organizations (22 % of claims). The eco - anthropocentric argument 
refers to the rise of sea level, drought and other extreme weather phenomena that affect 
the life conditions of human populations; Africa is especially vulnerable to these 
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impacts like drought. Some countries like Tuvalu are even at risk to totally disappear 
from the map. Especially the United Nation’s arguments stemmed from this world that 
also emphasized the positions of climate refugees. The island states of AOSIS said that 
“they are negotiating their survival” in Copenhagen and cannot accept the limit of 2 
degrees. 
“Every year, 300 000 people die because of global warming. It is not a question of 
adaptation but survival.” (Kumi Naidu, Director of Greenpeace International [NGO], Le 
Monde, December 12, 2009)  
In this context the role of rainforests as human habitats and livelihood was emphasized.  
Other actors acknowledged the ecological justification as well but used it less as a main 
justification type themselves. No actor denounced ecological values in the media debate 
directly. It seems that in the era of climate change, every actor is obliged to say 
something about the environment. This indicates to the point that the worth of the world 
of ecology is recognized and understood as contributing to the common good. Also, 
ecological arguments are bound to be used strategically because environmental issues 
have nowadays become things that no actor can neglect or deny; business actors for the 
sake of their image, politicians for the sake of their votes and so on. In relation to 
justification theory, we are operating in the world of fame where reputation and image 
are regarded as worthy and important. 
Le Monde reported that Greenpeace and a French civic group were having a project 
against deforestation in Indonesia during the Copenhagen Summit. The NGO’s were 
trying to save the Indonesian forests; Greenpeace by setting up camps near the 
harvesting areas and Planète Urgence by planting mangroves near the coastline of 
Sumatra and by putting pressure to the Indonesian government. The message of 
Greenpeace was addressed especially to the pulp industry and was explicitly based on 
the Green world demanding the industry to stop the deforestation that destructs the 
ecosystem, trees and peat bogs. 
While analyzing the material, I was trying to pay special attention to ways how actors 
classify nature or speak about the environment. While I found many arguments stating 
the intrinsic value of nature and its rich biodiversity, also arguments emphasizing the 
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environment as a resource were visible: nature is often seen as a source for economic 
growth, having market worth. The prime minister of Estonia states: 
“It is common to state that small countries of the EU do not care enough of the 
environment, in particular, of climate change. The idea is that the poorer a country is, the 
less it cares about the environment. I think that this is erroneous: small countries are more 
dependent of the quality of the environment because it affects more profoundly their 
economy.” (Andrus Ansip, prime minister of Estonia [government], Le Monde, 
December 12, 2009) 
In the article, Ansip also states that we can attain economic growth in the future by 
investing on less polluting energy production modes. In this view, nature is still viewed 
as something we should take advantage of, as a resource. This brings us to the next 
theme, to the market justification and its usage in the French climate change debate. 
Market solutions to climate change 
Market justifications were very rarely used as a main justification or a main solution to 
prevent climate change: only 6 % during Copenhagen and 14 % during Durban were of 
this kind. However, because only two main justification types are coded, the table can 
be misleading with only 5 market justifications. Indeed, market justifications were very 
commonly used as an extra to boost one’s argument. 
Business actors were, unsurprisingly, the most keen to use market justifications as their 
main way to convince other people: over a third of their justifications were based on the 
market world. The other actors’ use of the market justification was fewer. 
When weighing proposed solutions to the problem of climate change, in terms of the 
market world, the question is: how struggle against climate change at the lowest cost 
and most effectively without perturbing economic activity too much? 
 “The struggle against climate change, from whatever angle we examine it, leads us often 
to economy and to the question of money.  
It is also this question that is for the most part asked in the international negotiations that 
commenced the 7th December in Copenhagen. How much does global warming cost now 
and in the future? (Journalist, Le Monde, December 8, 2009) 
A common argument was to say that the expenses will be smaller the quicker we start to 
act and develop carbon free technologies and modes of production. This argument 
demonstrates how climate change is an economic as well as an ecological issue. 
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Speakers also emphasized that we have to keep economic realities in mind and 
consequently oppose to solutions that may be harmful for economic growth and 
employment markets. It was also common to claim that the transition to clean energy 
technologies must be made in the least expensive way.  
Proposed market mechanisms included for example carbon trading and investment in 
innovations. Carbon trading is a system where enterprises are granted with emission 
quotas and they can sell and buy these quotas in the market. The EU has had its own 
carbon trading system since 2005. However, it is interesting that discussions on carbon 
trading were quite rare in Le Monde; there were only a couple of actors that offered 
carbon trading as a main solution to prevent climate change. Also, critical debates on 
carbon trading were missing from the media debate; it was mostly seen in a positive 
light and only mentioned in passing. The civil society, on the other hand, is much more 
critical towards carbon trading as we will later see in chapter 6. 
Business actors usually prefer carbon trading to the carbon tax. Air France-KLM writes 
in Le Monde demanding that the aviation industry would include itself to the European 
system of permit quotas: 
“… Preferring taxation to carbon trading would be a mistake, at least if we want to tackle 
CO2 emissions and not just penalize the aviation industry. Which – must I remind you – 
contributes strongly to economic and social development in many countries … In both 
national and taxation solutions, we would reach the opposite goal.” (Pierre-Henri 
Gourgeon, General Manager of Air France-KLM [business], Le Monde, December 16, 
2009.) 
The UN REDD – programme is also a market solution to climate change. It is a project 
that tries to slow down deforestation by classifying forests as carbon sinks: in this 
discourse the nature has market worth according to its ability to absorb carbon. These 
carbon credits are traded in the market. Discussions on REDD were as well few. The 
UN has organized “a day of the forest” since the Bali Summit in 2007 that regroups 
experts, NGO’s and economic actors to discuss deforestation projects in the framework 
of the REDD – project. Le Monde wrote an article of this event during the Copenhagen 
Summit with a title “The saving of tropical forests is already a market” (15.12.2009). 
According to this article, business actors are becoming more and more visible in the 
process: 
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“… The international community has decided that the fight against deforestation would 
be part of the range of actions to control climate change … The Americans, that’s certain, 
are very interested and rely on the forest carbon market to achieve their emissions 
reductions in GHG - emissions. Large American companies like Dell are already 
financing projects in Indonesia, Brazil and Guyana … The REDD continues to raise 
important concerns.  The overwhelming majority of countries that could benefit from 
funding the fight against deforestation are countries with weak governance.” (Journalist, 
Le Monde, December 15, 2009) 
Economic growth and the Environment – can we have both? 
“If the climate was a bank, The United States would have already saved it.” (Hugo 
Chavez, president of Venezuela [government], Le Monde, December 13, 2009) 
Following the lines of Mr Chavez, the global civil society’s one of the mottos in 
demonstrations during the Copenhagen Summit was “Let’s change the system, not the 
climate”. The Climate Justice Now - collective declared for their part that market 
solutions proposed by governments are “unjust and based on the market” (Le Monde, 
December 15, 2009). 
“We have global warming because capitalism doesn’t pay attention to anything.” 
 (Demonstrator [NGO], Le Monde, December 12, 2009) 
Capitalist economy needs constant growth but what is good for the economy, is often 
bad for the environment. The tensions of the green world and the market world are 
probably the most evident clashes in the climate change debate. Does the other always 
come first? If does, which one? And is it possible to put the two into a compromise 
position where both get appreciated and valued? Furthermore, which actors do not see a 
contradiction between economic growth and the capacity of the environment, which 
actors are promoting a more radical change of the whole economic system and which 
actors’ opinions stand in the middle of the two extremes? 
This theme is clearly a dividing point in the French domestic politics. Sarkozy used the 
Copenhagen Summit quite strategically by making ecology a campaign theme in his 
party’, UMP’s, run up to the elections. The campaign was presumably a way to increase 
his own and UMP’s popularity in financially and politically difficult times. The 
president positioned his party as an counter pool to the Green Party’s (Les Verts) 
agenda by stating that UMP promotes “people’s ecology; écologie populaire”, instead 
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of the Green party’s more radical views. In an article Sarkozy criticizes the Greens, led 
by Cécile Duflot:  
“The Greens are promoting the improbable strategy of degrowth … don’t they know that 
there is unemployment and misery? … But ecology is not a fad, a trick or a position, it’s 
a conviction.” (President Nicolas Sarkozy, [government], Le Monde, December 1, 2009) 
In Sarkozy’s opinion it is possible to achieve sustainable growth; to make a compromise 
between economic growth and the environment. In his opinion, other alternatives won’t 
do because reducing poverty requires growth. Over all, Sarkozy had a very active role 
during the Copenhagen summit and used pretty strong words to prove his point. He also 
invited environmental NGO’s to the Élysée Palace to discuss climate politics – a very 
rare thing to do by a French president. Still, the NGO’s were not convinced: 
"Nicolas Sarkozy did not convince us. France could show a good example and push the 
European Union further but it is merely sending out messages of good intentions.”  (Claude 
Bascompte, president of the Friends of the Earth [NGO], Le Monde, December 11, 2009)  
Martine Aubry, the leader of the Socialist Party (PS), also participates in this discussion 
and positions the PS in a clear opposition to the L’UMP. In the article she supports the 
implementation of carbon tax and speaks of ecological solidarity, denouncing the 
destructive logics of unregulated markets:  
“A new economic model, at the same time ecological and social, that does not merely aim at 
decarbonizing and greening the most unregulated and savage global capitalism in order to 
continue the “business as usual”- lane. The extent of environmental change requires us to 
revolutionize our model of growth and development to conform it to the ecological imperative ... 
We must rethink our patterns of consumption and production and the operation of world trade ... 
The international trade must be governed by new social and environmental rules, which will take 
precedence over those of competition.” (Martine Aubry, politician, Le Monde December 3, 2009) 
In the article, Aubry is also justifying with the civic justice – argument, as she is 
appealing to solidarity and to a new social, more equitable order. She is criticizing the 
world of the market from the world of ecology. The socialists clearly have a different 
conception of what should be done to combat climate change than the L’UMP, who 
believes in competition and growth. The French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde 
(UMP) and the French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner (UMP) also stated that even 
though environmental regulation is urgent and wished for, it should not perturb financial 
transactions. 
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The concepts of green economy and green growth are good examples of the 
compromise between the market and the world of ecology. According to the market 
discourse environmental policy must go hand in hand with principles of cost-
effectivness and competitivness. A French industrial boss writes in Le Monde: 
“Saint-Gobain, world leader of housing, has made green growth one of its primary axes 
in its strategy and development, like other international groups. This implicates a 
powerful effort de R&D and innovation. The strong demand for energy-efficient products 
and solutions permits reducing costs quickly and ensures a wide diffusion: virtuous 
economic and environmental circle.” (Pierre-André de Chalendar, General Manager of 
Saint-Gobain [business], Le Monde, December, 3, 2009) 
Many business actors denied that there was any controversy between ecological and 
economic objectives. Most of them also claimed that markets own actions will lead to 
better ecological results than regulation from the top. A French business leader 
underlines the importance of voluntarism and being autonomous on different levels of 
engagement in opposition to relying on policy makers. He is against restrictions, 
regulations and sanctions and accuses current diplomacy and global governance of 
ineffectiveness and stagnation. Instead, he calls upon “soft law” and “the convergence 
of economic and ecological interests”. In his opinion, this convergence will happen in 
harmonic co-operation between the market and the civil society: 
“Antagonism, it no longer exists. NGO’s and professionals have had the same objectives 
for a long time. It is false and counterproductive to emphasize the cleavages between 
industry and environment. For example, the global maritime industry didn’t wait for 
either Copenhagen or Kyoto to reduce its emissions. Why? Because economic and 
ecological interests converge! … Firms have long ago mainstreamed sustainable 
development into their business strategies; even if it costs them. Not because they were 
forced but because it is their best interest … "Economic actors will continue to pursue 
voluntary, effective and pragmatic actions, for the sake of the environment. With the 
NGO’s. Without waiting for politics.” (Christian Garin, president of Armateurs de France, a 
Professional organization of French maritime enterprises [business], Le Monde, December 21, 
2009.) 
 
Le Monde had a 6-piece article series called “The lessons of the [financial] crisis” 
during the Copenhagen summit where the journalists assess the relationship between 
economic logics and ecological imperatives. In one of the articles, the journalist 
analyses how we could reduce inequalities without economic growth. In another article, 
the journalist ponders on the possibility of a change of system in the light of economic 
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history; why couldn’t our current economic model change and be different, after all it 
has transformed many times in history, the journalist asks: 
”The resourcefulness of the inventor, the dynamism of the entrepreneur, the vision of the 
politician, the mechanisms of the market, the consumers’ thirst for innovation, but also 
the resistance of certain actors, who might all as well agree or disagree with each other, 
and lead to major advances as well as major failures … We shouldn’t just state that green 
growth is either a certitude or an illusion but investigate the conditions of its arrival.” 
(Journalist, Le Monde, December 8, 2009) 
To conclude, the problem of climate change is addressed in the media especially 
through argumentation stemming from the civic world: speakers in the French media 
debate value democratic decision making at the global level. As we will next see, the 
civic world is a combining factor between the media and interview data. 
6 Analysis III: Civil Society’s Alternative Frames to Climate Politics 
Next I will move on to the interviews of the French civil society. The purpose is to 
deepen our understanding of the media data and its context and put the two materials 
into a discursive relation. The interviews used in the study have been analysed 
qualitatively to deepen our understanding of the dynamics in the French context by 
descending to the level of publicities formed by the local NGO’s.  
In chapter 6.1 I will examine what kinds of themes and values the French NGO’s 
emphasize in interviews in relation to media data and to other actors. I will also pay 
attention to how they see their overall role in the politics of climate change. In this 
context the NGO’s emphasize the need to move towards more localised, regional 
governance modes - for the sake of the global climate. 
The most visible juxtaposition in the interview material was between the values 
stemming from the civic world and the values stemming from the market world. The 
NGO’s showed clear criticism towards the market-based solutions such as carbon 
trading and the mechanisms in which trees are classified as carbon sinks, having 
monetary value. In these discussions civic, market and ecological worth were seen as 
incompatible.   
In chapter 6.2 I will reflect on the theme of climate justice and how it is even more 
common in the interview material than in the media data. Climate justice is put into a 
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larger political context by the NGO’s who point towards the need to change the whole 
economic and social system. Overall, the French NGO’s were very unanimous on the 
majority of issues dealt with in this chapter.  
 
6.1 Democratic Regulation vs. Market Solutions 
Among the interviewed environmental NGO’s, the civic world is as well at the heart of 
the debate like in the media debate, but in a more pressing and challenging manner; the 
civil world is explicitly set against other world of justifications which are denounced 
from the civic perspective. The argumentation in general is more radical and 
confrontational than that of NGO’s in the media data. I will next discuss about the 
themes stemming from the civic world and how these themes clash to other worlds of 
justifications.  
The French NGO’s highlighted the importance of democratic decision making as one of 
the main solutions to tack le climate change: they agreed that a global, constraining 
contract is necessary because the crisis is global and because together the countries will 
achieve more. Even though the NGO’s value global negotiations they show at the same 
time clear frustration towards the UN system and its inability to produce outcomes in 
climate change governance. The same discourse was very visible in the French media as 
well after the Copenhagen Summit. 
The democratic-industrial regulation refers to the preference of state regulation and 
planning to market mechanisms in producing effective outcomes. This preference leads 
to the critique of market solutions: the NGO’s showed scepticism towards the proposed 
“innovative market solutions” in the governance of climate change. In the media debate, 
these viewpoints were much less visible: the NGO’s concentrated on promoting the 
values of climate justice. It was also rare for other actors to explicitly denounce market 
solutions.  
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Carbon trading especially takes a big hit from the French NGO’s: 
“The EU’s carbon trading system, it is a catastrophe, a mere masquerade.” (RESP01) 
In their opinion, carbon trading was considered to be an ineffective solution to climate 
change: firstly, because it doesn’t really diminish the impact of GHG’s in the 
atmosphere and secondly, carbon trading is in their opinion just about abstract markets 
that float. Thirdly, the quota prizes were considered too low to function as an incentive 
for reducing emissions. One of the interviewees was however more optimistic and said 
that carbon trading could also work, depending on the level of action. 
Especially international projects on deforestation, based on obtaining carbon credits 
through investing in carbon sinks, stirred up strong feelings: these projects were 
denounced for merely following the logics of the market: 
“We are against this kind of financialization and against the way of thinking that nature is 
something you can put a price tag on … and the concept of nature as economic capital; 
the commodification of nature. People no longer have the right to forests but enterprises 
like General Motors that finance carbon sink projects. It is grotesque.” (RESP01) 
The above quote is critique towards the market world where objects are classified and 
valued by their prize and monetary value. Furthermore, the quote reflects a worldview 
where NGO’s think that the environment should have primarily other value than market 
value, pointing towards the green world. In addition, market solutions are criticized 
from the civil world as problematic in meeting the standards of democratic legitimacy 
and accountability. In the media data, this concern was visible among the French 
journalists as well. The increasing power of multinational companies in environmental 
governance was as well denounced: 
“It is important to discuss the creation of a global environmental organization but the 
main point must be that in this new instance, environmental issues would be primary to 
commercial issues and the rights of investors … the current propositions are bad; they 
come from multinationals like Nestlé that are pushing the influence of the economic 
sector in the environmental governance.” (RESP01) 
The concept of green economy raised doubts as well: it was denounced by being the 
rhetoric of geopolitics more than about the protection of environment and local ways of 
life: “it [green economy] has its winners and losers as well”, says one of the 
 
 
  58 
interviewees. Relating to the dominance of neoliberal politics in general, the French 
NGO’s said that the whole system where we live in should be reorganized from top to 
the bottom because economy is currently overriding ecological questions: the market 
world is being denounced from the world of ecology and civic world. 
State regulation by the implementation of carbon tax was in principle supported but also 
regarded as being an insufficient solution. Instead, the NGO’s called for the 
reorganization of the whole fiscal system; that the markets should be regulated by 
democratic institutions. These taxes are usually denounced by business actors that 
instead promote carbon trading that is in their opinion a more flexible and effective 
mechanism, and thus privilege market solutions and voluntary engagements.  
Interestingly, the use of market solutions such as carbon trading seems to be the thing 
that divides the global civil society, producing internal fractions and resulting in 
different camps: this division was visible among the interview material as well. Another 
difference, relating to the previous, is whether to put primary emphasis on ecological 
values or social justice. During the Copenhagen COP, the climate justice movement 
organized a counter meeting called Climate Forum and its purpose was to “reunite 
people from all over the world, not just experts and politicians, to emphasize the values 
of ecology and social justice”, said the spokesman of the Forum. (Le Monde, December 
10, 2009.) Le Monde reported relatively visibly about this meeting. 
“The objective is to make peoples’ voice heard: the peasants have something to say, 
women, fishers; it’s not solely a question of the environment in these discussions. 
Climate Justice Now wants to replace the question of social justice to the heart of the 
debate, and criticize the growing role of carbon trade in these debates.” (RESP01) 
The alternative meeting aimed at questioning the functions of global capitalism and 
carbon trading as a solution to climate change. In the interview material, the French 
NGO’s also hinted that there is a growing fracture between those NGO’s that accept 
carbon trading as a means and those who do not. The French NGO’s also say that after 
Copenhagen, the global civil society begun to crack; some promoted a more technical, 
expert and conventional line and some more radical methods and themes like the alter 
globalization movements. The NGO’s clearly have different conceptions of the suitable 
repertoires of action. 
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To conclude, a big concern for the NGO’s is the private governance of climate change 
and growing power of private actors at the expense of democratic institutions. The 
financing of UN programmes is nowadays on the responsibility of multinational 
corporations that also are deciding agendas in these programmes. One of the 
organizations has participated in an appeal with other NGO’s against this “corporate 
takeover of international institutions” which is resulting in the diminishing of civil 
society’s voice in the UN. Similarly in France, the fact that private businesses dictate 
energy policy was considered to be alarming: big energy companies influence French 
energy policies by working in close relations with public officials. The NGO’s argued 
that these small, closed circles have been a big obstacle for them to promote emission 
cuts and stronger engagements of the industry for the profit of the environment. 
In addition, the NGO’s say that a big problem in France is that it is “hyper-centralized”. 
This makes cooperating with local actors so difficult:  
”we have little small and medium enterprises which who we could work with. The 
situation is very different for example in Germany and Spain, where there are a lot of 
small businesses working in renewable energy; in France they are very few. Also, the 
investments in this sector are small. In France it is very complicated, groups are 
centralized and politics as well. So our interest is to decentralize energy governance and 
do it with the help of local collectives.” (RESP02) 
As we can see, the reason to choose certain political advocacy models over others is 
besides cultural factors also depending on institutional structures; it is hard for the 
NGO’s to produce local solutions when the political and economic system is very 
centralized. However, the dynamic between cultural factors and institutional settings 
works in both directions.  
The behaviour of states wasn’t valued high either. The NGO’s denounces the states of 
maximizing their own profits in international conferences. “In international negotiations, 
we no longer speak of climate but global geopolitics”, says one of the interviewees. One 
of the interviewees thinks that the Westphalia system of sovereign nations-states is dead 
and that we should establish international governance with real regulating power: 
“This system of nation-states or sovereign states that have the capacity to block 
negotiations with a single vote, it is not possible, it is not tenable … we have to establish 
international governance that possesses the capacity to regulate and sanction, I don’t see 
how it could be otherwise.” (RESP03) 
 
 
  60 
The need to decentralize 
The French NGO’s argued that while the UN system is currently failing catastrophically, 
more effective outcomes would be achieved at the local and regional level. This 
discourse is parallel to the discourse of business actors in the media data.   
All the NGO’s emphasized the importance of local and regional action, either by 
influencing individual behaviour or supporting the initiatives of collectives. This was 
seen as effective, just and good for the environment, combining arguments from the 
industrial, civil and the green world: 
”There is a strong linkage between local issues and climate issues like opposing the 
construction of airports, opposing the use of shale gas, auto routes and incinerators … 
The idea is to coordinate these kinds of initiatives and their relation to the local level 
mobilizations and emphasize the importance of local collectives.” 
“We must construct eco-citizens that take initiatives and try to articulate the local, 
national and regional resistances as well as real propositions. These citizens have a big 
role in this cultural, economic and social transformation.” (RESP01) 
The idea is to try establishing a relation between local mobilizations and international 
issues and developing alternatives for them. Questions about energy transition, like how 
to stabilize energy production and consumption, are most effectively dealt with at the 
regional level, the NGO’s argue. This kind of argumentation comes close to that of 
firms who argue for voluntary engagements and autonomous actions in Le Monde. 
However, the reasons for emphasizing local action are different; NGO’s do it mainly for 
civic reasons like mobilization of citizens and to diminish social injustice. Firms use 
this kind of argumentation mainly for reasons that have a base in the market world: 
because they are against state regulation and taxation in the fear of weakening 
competitiveness. 
Interacting with the French political culture 
The NGO’s and the French government converged on many issues to a surprisingly 
large extent; their argumentation stemmed mainly from the civil world. The NGO’s as 
well as the French government, considered a globally binding treaty with planned 
emission reductions to be the best solution to govern climate change. They both also 
stressed the perspective of climate justice: the rich, western countries bear historical 
 
 
  61 
responsibility of greenhouse gas emissions and must therefore make more sacrifices in 
the battle against climate change. 
The relations between the state and the environmental NGO’s were exceptionally close 
during Copenhagen COP. During the period of Nicolas Sarkozy and since the Grenelle 
de l’Environnement in 2007, environmental organizations have had relations and formal 
contact with the decision makers when they have the opportunity to present their view 
points on climate politics.  
Although, the NGO’s say that these meetings bare a very formal function: the 
reciprocity and effectiveness of these meetings with the state are questioned:  
“It is very basic advocacy; we arrive with our ideas, we present them and that’s it. And 
they [state officials], they give their responses and then we leave. It is a bit limited, it is 
very limited.” (RESP04) 
What do these close (albeit formal) relations indicate to in relation to the French 
political culture? Traditionally, the relations between the civil society and the state have 
been contentious and oppositional. The environmental NGO’s on the other hand argue 
that it is important to have good relations to the state and be in a constructive dialogue. 
Instead of opposition, the production of own propositions and the co-construction of 
issues were considered as valuable. Still, environmental NGO’s have not abandoned 
contention techniques, they just argue for mediation as well. This is in contrast to the 
American NGO’s that are more like implementing organizations, not government watch 
dogs like in France. (See Korpivaara 2013.) 
The interviewed environmental NGO’s also aim at being credible in the eyes of decision 
makers; this is why they emphasize the importance of negotiation and present 
themselves as experts and reliable negotiators. This also indicates that these civic actors 
are moving more and more towards the industrial world: the stereotypical images of 
radical activists are quite far from this perspective, which also shows in the lack of 
inspirational arguments (Look e.g. Ylä-Anttila 2010, 194-199). 
One explaining factor for these changes might be the qualities of environmental NGO’s 
in comparison with other types of NGO’s in France; the environmental NGO’s work in 
a field which acquires more professionalized information due to the complexity and 
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scientific nature of their field of interest, climate change and it’s the global nature. Their 
repertoires of action are therefore more varied and structured in comparison to more 
radical associations. 
One can however speculate on what lies behind these surprisingly friendly relations that 
grew colder after Copenhagen:  
But our solutions were not the same, the level of ambition differed. Also, domestic politics 
affected Sarkozy who was trying to please the voters of The Green Party. After 
Copenhagen, the dialogue broke off and then there was Fukushima and the president’s 
views became totally the opposite of ours. So the government changed direction totally 
and that showed in the elections as well. And when Sarkozy loosed the regional elections, 
he buried the carbon tax initiative.” (RESP02) 
Still, the French NGO’s argued that something is changing in the relation between the 
state and the civil society even though we cannot talk of big, revolutionary changes. 
One of the interviewees said that France needs a change of culture and explained that 
the opposition and advocacy models of the French civil society might stem from 
syndicalism: 
“We have the impression that we always have to go the battle. It should be more about 
the co-construction of issues. But there is evolvement.” (RESP04) 
6.2 Climate Justice: Demands for Another Society 
“I think climate change is the key to a lot of things; it will aggravate existing social and economic 
problems and conflicts, between the rich and the poor countries as well as inside countries. It will 
increase inequalities in the world. This really touches and revolts me.” (RESP01) 
Climate justice is a term emphasized by the French NGO’s; it combines and inter-
relates the ecological and civic justice argument. In the media debate, NGO’s 
concentrated on promoting this theme as well: the solutions to climate change must lead 
to socially just outcomes and should not make the poor suffer even more. The 
connection between development and environmental issues was therefore highlighted. 
According to the French NGO’s, the term climate justice relates to the fact that the most 
vulnerable to environmental disasters are the most poor populations, “especially the 
southern countries where the farmers don’t know when to plant anymore because the 
dry and humid seasons are so irregular (RESP03).” In relation to the media debate, the 
discourse of NGO’s in the interviews emphasizes more these kinds of direct 
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consequences to people in poor and vulnerable areas in the world. Furthermore, the 
French NGO’s argued that the situation of the poor countries should be improved for 
example by focusing on developing agriculture, education and health systems. While in 
the media debate, the northern governments mainly discussed climate justice in a more 
technical and distant manner, focusing on how much they should pay financial aid to 
developing countries or assist in technology transfers.  
Similar to the NGO’s claims about marketization of climate change governance, their 
claims have more radical stances in the interview material when they talk about climate 
justice. They emphasize ecological transition and the need to move towards a society, 
which would function in a more equitable way. One solution would be to develop public 
services to meet the needs of the poorest populations and enhance their quality of life 
through investing in energy efficiency, accommodation, public transport and by 
bringing production and consumption closer together. This could be financed with 
progressive taxation: taxing the rich, multinationals and financial markets in the rich 
countries. 
”We need to increase the power relations of the civil society, offer real alternatives and 
push people to really seize these environmental questions in the society. It does not 
suffice to offer technical solutions or go meet the ruling. The solutions must be 
essentially just and they need to help us build another society.” (RESP01) 
”We need to attain degrowth in the sense of reducing our needs like cars, big houses or 
 computers. The solution is not about laws or conventions.” (RESP04) 
What is noticeable about NGO’s argumentation on climate justice is that it refers to 
justice within countries as well as between countries. The demand for internal justice 
indicates to changing national taxation systems more just, more progressive and 
avoiding putting the burden on small income classes. Indeed, one can once again 
observe quite radical demands for a change of system, which is seen as obligatory in the 
light of current state of affairs – this is to some extent visible also in the newspaper 
material. A repeating theme with the French NGO’s is power relations and the need to 
change them for the benefit of the civil society. 
Relating to the change of the system, one interviewee argues that the concept of society 
is changing and thinks that the individual cannot perceive him/herself like in the 20th or 
even 18th century; with climate change, the individual can have conscience of self in 
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relation to the world around, a new relation to the planet and its affiliated actors. In 
terms of justification theory, this indicates that social and material worlds are 
interrelated; that the current dominance of global, capitalist economy is happening at the 
expense of nature and people.   
In terms of green technology, the NGO’s showed scepticism: they oppose to the blind 
confidence and optimism towards technological solutions. This kind of negative stance 
towards technological solutions was lacking in the media debate. NGO’s argued that 
technology can bring real solutions in the medium and long term (in 50 years) but at the 
moment these irreversible human and environmental effects are not acceptable and 
should be addressed immediately with other solutions like concentrating on changing 
individual behaviour like reducing energy consumption and strengthening the 
repertoires of local collectives. In this context the use of nuclear power was seen as a 
“moral trap” for inaction in the field of energy efficiency and development of renewable 
energy. The NGO’s were worried that France will just continue down the same lines, 
without any structural changes in energy policy.  
Also, one fact that is in public discussions often neglected is that green technologies 
contribute to climate change by using natural resources and rare minerals. Most of the 
NGO’s are in consequence, once again, pointing to the reduction of needs and the 
reorganization of the whole society. 
7 Conclusions 
This study set out to examine what kind of moral and political claims actors make in the 
French public sphere and how the French political culture is visible in this debate. As 
we have seen, along governments, there are a lot of non-state actors including 
environmental NGO’s, business lobbies, scientists and other actors that form rich and 
vibrant networks, escaping traditional levels of analysis. (Newell & Bulkeley 2010, 34.) 
They all have differing views on what should be done to tackle climate change and what 
kinds of solutions contribute best to the common good. Converging on the issue has 
proved itself to be difficult, as the one after another failing international conference 
demonstrates.  
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The focus point has been on tracking cultural factors and French specificities of this 
debate and to emphasize French civil society‘s point of view by adding a grass root 
approach to the study of the media debate. The three main results are the following: 
Firstly, arguments stemming from the civic world are at the heart of the French debate 
and considered the worthiest in the public debate when convincing others in disputes. 
The civic world also forms a bridge between the media debate and the interviews from 
the civil society; NGO’s as well as other actors ranging from state representatives to 
business leaders, argued that democratic negotiations and cooperation, with the 
objective of a globally binding agreement are important solutions in tackling with 
climate change. This finding is in clear contrast to the U.S where both the government 
and the civil society put technological and market solutions first and emphasized more 
local and voluntary solutions (Korpivaara 2013, 70 - 73). 
These findings are in line with earlier studies on environmental disputes in France 
(Lamont & Thévenot 2000) where civic and industrial arguments gained the majority in 
the French debate. The industrial justification was indeed the second most used in the 
French argumentation, often combined to the civic world by referring to state planning 
of emission reductions and to the regulation of negative externalities produced by the 
market, and when used independently referring to the development of green 
technologies and to the scientific consensus of human-induced climate change. 
Furthermore, considering the dimensions of the civic world, climate change issues are 
relatively deeply connected to questions of social justice: this is a clear French 
specificity comparing to the findings from the debate in the U.S. media and civil society 
(Korpivaara 2013). Protecting the environment is deeply interconnected to the solutions 
of reducing existing and historically produced social inequalities in the world; they 
cannot be separated. In this context the French government, journalists, and NGO’s 
emphasized solidarity towards the poorer, southern countries. The climate justice 
viewpoint became even more visible and pressing in the interviews of French NGO’s. 
It is very revealing that all the French actors seem to favour justifying themselves with 
civic arguments; even business actors do it although they don’t use civic arguments as 
their main justification but instead market and industrial arguments. However, the fact 
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that these actors still feel the need to boost their arguments with civic arguments 
demonstrates the importance of the civic world in the French political culture.  
The tensions between the market, civic and world of ecology were quite visible in the 
newspaper material. The use of market arguments was still considered to be a legitimate 
base for discussions in Le Monde; very few actors questioned the foundation of 
capitalism as a way to organize economic relations; they just called for more democratic 
regulation to diminish the negative externalities harmful for the environment and the 
climate. Furthermore, the discourse on the growing popularity of market solutions and 
private governance in climate change, as has been observed by Newell & Bulkeley 
(2010), was not visible in the French media debate but instead civic solutions were at 
the core of the cultural tool kit. 
Secondly, I found out that the civil society offered alternative frames to conceptualize 
the climate change debate and its dynamics. The discourse of NGO’s was more radical 
in the interviews where market solutions and democratic – industrial regulation were 
thought of as two opposite poles in the governance of climate change. The NGO’s 
argued that the principles of the market, protection of the environment and achieving 
social justice are internally inconsistent principles and instead argued for more profound 
changes in social practices and society’s power relations: the power of multinational 
firms was criticized and the eternal faith in technological solutions and economic 
growth was questioned. The NGO’s thus argued that mere regulation of capitalism that 
was discussed to some extent in the media is insufficient and even cosmetic. 
Consequently, it is interesting to notice the difference in different publics, especially 
between a mainstream, national media institution like Le Monde and smaller publics 
like those formed by environmental NGO’s: actors say different things in different 
publicities. The newspaper material was less confrontational and less nuanced; this 
implicates to the fact that actors need to moderate their message in a mainstream, 
prestigious paper like Le Monde. This phenomenon could be referred to as the 
moderation effect and would be an interesting topic for further research: Ylä-Anttila 
(2010) and Salo (2012) have also noticed the same effect, Ylä-Anttila in his studies on 
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the globalization movement in the mainstream publicity in Finland and Salo in her 
studies on the anti - globalization movement’s counter publicity in Finland.  
Furthermore, even though environmental NGO’s have formal inclusion to many 
decision making processes in France their alternative perspectives do not gain that much 
visibility in the mainstream media or get access to the political agendas; their points of 
views are a target of symbolic, political and economic power. In other words, we can 
question to which extent the media functions as an equal platform for democratic, 
public discussions, referring to Nancy Frasers’ reflections on the normative legitimacy 
and political effectiveness of the public sphere (Fraser 2007).  
As presented in the literature review, Ruth Reitan has argued for the existence of a 
polarization among the global civil society: this division was also visible in my material. 
There are internal tensions and contradictions in the civil society referring to the 
preferred solutions to climate change. The fact that carbon trading divides the civil 
society is an interesting result: In the civil society, some actors argue that social and 
ecological objectives go hand in hand, and that market solutions will lead to unjust 
outcomes while others are more optimistic about market solutions. Whether we should 
put a price tag on the environment, relates to these disputes as well. The Climate Justice 
Now – network believes more strongly than the more moderate CAN that capitalism 
does not contribute to socially and ecologically good results: its discourse is also more 
embedded on the wider political context: to the resistance of neoliberal globalization 
and money power. This division between environmental NGO’s therefore reflects the 
divide proposed by Reitan and would also be an interesting topic for further research. 
Thirdly, in respect to the relationship between the state and the NGO’s, this relationship 
was formally exceptionally close during the Copenhagen summit. It seems that even 
though civil society actors and the French state have had very conflicted and 
oppositional relations in the past (e.g. Alapuro 2005; Jepperson 2009) they succeeded in 
converging on the problem of climate change in many ways. However, this convergence 
undoubtedly had a lot to do with Sarkozy’s domestic political strategizing and the 
nature of environmental NGO’s who often are more professionalized and organized 
unlike smaller, more radical associations that instead of mediation and production 
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concentrate more on opposition.  Whether this convergence is permanent or temporary, 
remains to be seen.  
Regarding the media debate, the speakers in Le Monde did not show scepticism or raise 
controversies towards climate science or the theory of human induced climate change. 
The notions of a more controversial third phase in the media debate (see Aykut, Comby 
& Guillemot, Hélène 2012) which has been argued to be characterized by growing 
controversialism since the Copenhagen Summit in themes like science and policy 
relationship, expertise and climate science was not visible in my material. On the other 
hand, the controversies have shifted to politics instead; they refer to different solutions, 
objectives and levels of action concerning the control of global warming.  
With these results, a critical reflection on the limitations of this study and possible 
solutions for further research is in place. Firstly, relating to the method of this study, it 
came clear during the analysis that the industrial world is in need of further elaboration 
in the coding scheme, at least when analysing the climate change debate, in which it has 
multiple meanings such as climate science, efficiency, technological solutions and state 
planning and measuring of emission reductions. The industrial world covers a wide 
range of issues and to properly describe the empirical world in a quantitative manner 
would need more subcategories as has been done with the civic world. In addition, the 
analysis would have benefited from the quantification of justification combinations; it 
would have helped to thematize the study in a clearer manner and to shed light on the 
connections between different worlds of justification. 
Secondly, we can reflect on the material of this study and its representativeness of the 
French debate. In Le Monde, some actors’ voice like that of business actors was 
relatively weak. Instead governments, experts, journalists and NGO’s point of views 
were at the spotlight. To really see how economic actors speak of climate change would 
have demanded other material as well.  
Relating to the material, how do we know for sure that these results do not stem from 
the journalistic norms characteristic to leftist Le Monde like Brossard et al. (2004) 
suggest? Or, could the institutional structure explain the use of civic arguments? It is 
easy to favour democratic regulation and international agreements when France’s 
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energy system is based on nuclear power: France is not dependent on fossil fuels and 
wouldn’t suffer the consequences of these regulations. Also, France’s centralized 
politics as well as the energy system might explain why French actors see global 
agreement so essential: the NGO’s noted, for example, that the lack of small and 
medium enterprises in the domain of renewable energy with whom they could cooperate 
independently of political powers is an obstacle in promoting climate friendly practices.  
However, I argue that these factors do not explain the tendency to use civic arguments 
in the French debate. There are at least two reasons for this: firstly, all the French actors, 
from business leaders to NGO’s, felt the need to use argumentation stemming from the 
civic world, which is in contrast to the U.S. where even NGO’s promoted technological 
and market solutions to climate change (Korpivaara 2013). More importantantly, French 
actors didn’t just argue for a global agreement but stressed global climate justice as well.  
Secondly, Lamont & Thévenot (2000) and Luhtakallio (2010) have also observed the 
central role of the civic world in the French context in their research; Lamont & 
Thévenot by comparing environmental disputes in France and in the US, and 
Luhtakallio by comparing democratic practices in Finland and France. Following, I 
argue that the strength of civic arguments implicates something more in the French 
political culture and what the conceptions of justice in that culture are. In this 
perspective, political culture is something independent from institutional structures. The 
specific justifications actors use form a picture of the political culture where some 
elements belong and some do not. Still, in order to prove the independent explanatory 
power of the political culture would need further research on other French newspapers 
like the more right-wing Figaro and French tabloids, as well as research on other policy 
sectors in France. 
Finally, the discussed results of this study demonstrate that solutions to climate change 
are targets of continuous disputes. All the offered solutions, however neutral they may 
seem, always carry a moral dimension because they have political consequences 
according to which worth is distributed differently to the objects in the social world. 
Even though currently, we are said to live in a neoliberal era, French actors have not 
shifted away from emphasizing democratic decision-making, regulation and social 
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justice like many other countries have done. This indicates that the French political 
culture, a result of long historical processes, carries a strong civic dimension still. 
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